

Objection 1. It would seem that the damned do not hate God. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “the beautiful and good that is the cause of all goodness and beauty is beloved of all.” But this is God. Therefore God cannot be the object of anyone’s hate.

Objection 2. Further, no one can hate goodness itself, as neither can one will badness itself since “evil is altogether involuntary,” as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is goodness itself. Therefore no one can hate Him.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): “The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually.”

I answer that, The appetite is moved by good or evil apprehended. Now God is apprehended in two ways, namely in Himself, as by the blessed, who see Him in His essence; and in His effects, as by us and by the damned.

Since, then, He is goodness by His essence, He cannot in Himself be displeasing to any will; wherefore whoever sees Him in His essence cannot hate Him. On the other hand, some of His effects are displeasing to the will in so far as they are opposed to any one: and accordingly a person may hate God not in Himself, but by reason of His effects. Therefore the damned, perceiving God in His punishment, which is the effect of His justice, hate Him, even as they hate the punishment inflicted on them*.

Reply to Objection 1. The saying of Dionysius refers to the natural appetite. and even this is rendered perverse in the damned, by that which is added thereto by their deliberate will, as stated above (a. 1)†.

Reply to Objection 2. This argument would prove if the damned saw God in Himself, as being in His essence.

* Cf. q. 90, a. 3, ad 2; IIa IIae, q. 34, a. 1 † Cf. IIa IIae, q. 34, a. 1, ad 1 where St. Thomas gives another answer