

Objection 1. It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably assigns three species of anger—“wrath,” “ill-will” and “rancor.” For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because “the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath *cholos*, if anger continue it is called ill-will *menis*; while rancor *kotos* is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance.” Therefore these are not different species of anger.

Objection 2. Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that “excandescencia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call *thymosis*, and is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently”; while according to Damascene *thymosis*, is the same as the Greek *kotos* [rancor]. Therefore *kotos* does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.

Objection 3. Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger, namely, “anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and anger with perfection of speech,” corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): “Whosoever is angry with his brother” [thus implying “anger without utterance”], and then, “whosoever shall say to his brother, ‘Raca’” [implying “anger with utterance yet without full expression”], and lastly, “whosoever shall say ‘Thou fool’” [where we have “perfection of speech”]. Therefore Damascene’s division is imperfect, since it takes no account of utterance.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa*.

I answer that, The species of anger given by Dama-

scene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger *cholos* [bile] because it quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to *menis* [ill-will] which is derived from *menein* [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to *kotos* [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged[†]. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons *akrocholoï* [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls *pikroï* [bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls *chalepoi* [ill-tempered], because they never rest until they have retaliated[‡].

Reply to Objection 1. All those things which give anger some kind of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference thereof.

Reply to Objection 2. Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the Greek *thymosis*, which is denoted by the Latin “furor,” should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged.

Reply to Objection 3. These degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the very movement of anger.

* Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi. † Eph. 4:31: “Let all bitterness and anger and indignation. . . be put away from you.” ‡ Cf. Ia IIae, q. 158, a. 5