

**Objection 1.** It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope be without charity.

**Objection 2.** Further, “no man believes unwillingly” as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection thereof, as stated above (q. 62, a. 3). Therefore faith cannot be without charity.

**Objection 3.** Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that “there can be no hope without love.” But love is charity: for it is of this love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.

**On the contrary,** A gloss on Mat. 1:2 says that “faith begets hope, and hope, charity.” Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity.

**I answer that,** Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.

Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect

character of virtue without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one’s own free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).

**Reply to Objection 1.** Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as stated.

**Reply to Objection 2.** This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue.

**Reply to Objection 3.** Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this is not without charity.