CHAPTER FIVE: ISLAM

THE UNITY AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

5.1 The createdness of the Qur’ân

The question of the createdness of the Qur’ân probably arose from discussion with Christians.  Since the Qur’ân calls Jesus the “Word of God” (4:171), Christians asked whether he was created (implying that God was once without a word) or uncreated (and therefore divine).

The argument was most likely transferred to the Qur’ân because of the question of qadar.  Since the Qur’ân is said to have pre-existed on a “preserved tablet” (lawh mahfűz, 85:22) or as the “mother of the book” (umm al-kitâb, 13:39, 43:4) and was “sent down” on the night of destiny (97:1), it would seem that the historical events described in the Qur’ân were predetermined.

To counter the idea of predestination, the Mu'tazilites argued that the Qur’ân was created.  They appealed to various Qur’ânic expressions such as, “We have made it (ja'alnâ-hu) an Arabic Qur’ân” (43:3), or it is on a “preserved tablet” (85:22), which implies that it is finite and therefore created, or “Falsehood does not come to it from in front or from behind” (41:42), which also implies finitude.  They also argued by raising speculative questions such as, how can a man hear, read or go over in his memory the eternal speech of God, and is this speech, the Qur’ân, God’s very substance or an accident distinct from his substance?

The question of the createdness or uncreatedness of the Qur’ân was prominent at the beginning of the 2nd 'Abbâsid century, echoing the focus on this question during the mihna.  Among early defendants of the Sunnite position who used Kalâm were 'Abdal'azîz al-Makkî (d. 849 or 854) and the sűfî al-Muhâsibî (d. 857).  Al-Khuraybî (d. 828), however, followed by many others, avoided the use of Kalâm in this subject and supported al-Mutawakkil’s prohibition of discussing the intricacies of what is created and what is uncreated in a copy or vocal recitation of the Qur’ân.

Al-Karâbisî (d. 859 or 862) is regarded as the founder of the theory called lafziyya.  Lafz means “utterance”, and according to this theory the Qur’ân is uncreated, but anyone’s utterance or recitation of ti is created.  Ahmad ibn-Hanbal bitterly opposed this theory and attacked its proponents.  He quoted Qur’ân 9:6 which speaks of an unbeliever being granted protection “so that he may hear the word of God”.  But if he is hearing only a created representation of the word of God (as the Mu'tazilites Ja'far ibn-Harb [d. 850] and Ja'far ibn-Mubashshir [d. 848] maintained), he is not nearing the real word of God.

Some people avoided taking sides on this question, like the Hadîth collector al-Bukhârî (d. 870), who said, “The Qur’ân is the speech of God uncreated, the acts of men are created,and inquiry into the matter is heresy”.[1]  Similar caution was shown by the Hanafite at-Tahâwî (d. 933) and al-Ash'arî.  Yet the Hanafite creed, the Wasiyya (written around 850), while avoiding the word lafz, says that the pen, paper and writing are created manifestations of the Qur’ân.  Another Hanafite creed of the late 10th century, Al-fiqh al-akbar II, explicitly says that the lafz of the Qur’ân is created.  Al-Ash'arî’s followers took a similar line and introduced the concept of kalâm nafsî, the Qur’ânic speech which is in the soul (nafs) before it is expressed; this they maintained was uncreated.

5.2 The Mu'tazilites and God’s unity

The question whether the Qur’ân is created came up only in the time of Hârűn ar-Rashîd, and a short time afterwards the question of God’s attributes arose.  The influence of philosophy led theologians to ask what is meant by the assertion that God has knowledge, speech, power etc.  The opponents of the Mu'tazilites said that these attributes were somehow distinct from God’s essence, whereas the Mu'tazilites retorted that if they were distinct there would be several eternal beings, and therefore several gods or hypostases as in the Christian Trinity.  The Mu'tazilites, therefore, said that all God’s attributes are identical with one another and with God’s essence.  Only his speech is not identical with his essence; in fact it is not part of God at all, but a creation.

The Mu'tazilites went on to teach that all anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur’ân should be given a metaphorical interpretation (ta’wîl).  Thus God’s hands mean his “grace” or “power”, and his face means his “essence”.

Al-Jubbâ’î (d. 915), among the later Mu'tazilites, held strictly to the Mu'tazilite idea of God’s unity, saying that God knows and acts by his essence and not by any attribute such as knowledge, even if this is equivalent to his essence.  Al-Jubbâ’î also held strictly to rational or linguistic criteria and not the Qur’ân in deciding whether any name was fitting for God.  He rejected, for instance, the name 'âqil (intelligent) because it derives from the word 'iqâl), the tether of a camel, and this might imply that God was subject to some impediment.  Al-Jubbâ’î also distinguished “essential” and “active” attributes, but his whole discussion of divine names appears to be strict linguistic nominalism; in other words, the names are merely a matter of human language and do not reflect anything of the reality of God and the richness of his being.

Abű-Hâshim (d. 933), son of al-Jubbâ’î and his successor as leader of the Basra Mu'tazilites, introduced the idea of “states” (ahwâl, sg.  hâl).  Originally a grammatical term indicating a modifying action word, like a participle, it was applied to adjectival attributes of God (e.g. “knowing”), and these he said were distinct from God’s essence, while existing only in (and not apart from) God’s essence.  This teaching about ahwâl, or adjectival attributes, was accepted by later Ash'arite theologians, who also maintained a distinct existence for God’s sifât al-ma'ânî, or substantial attributes.

Al-Ka'bî (d. 929 or 931) was for a time leader of the Mu'tazilites of Baghdad.  He tried to reduce the many names applied to God to just a few basic ones.  Thus “willing” is simply a combination of “knowing” and “creating”, while “hearing” and “seeing” are just aspects of “knowing”.

In spite of these men’s allowing of a real distinction among the attributes of God, the general Mu'tazilite position was that God and his attributes are all identical, with no real distinction in him whatsoever.

5.3 Those who distinguished God’s attributes

One of the earliest speculators about God’s unity was Hishâm ibn-al-Hakam (d.c. 805).  He used the term jism, which usually means “body”, in the wider sense of substance and applied it to God (for which he was criticized).  He was also the first to used the term ma'nâ (literally “meaning”) in the technical sense of an inseparable attribute, and in this way spoke of the attributes of God, such as power and knowledge.

Bishr al-Marîsî (d.c. 833) introduced a distinction between essential and active attributes, and among the latter he recognized four: will (mashî'a), knowledge ('ilm), power (qudra) and creativity (takhlîq).  Anthropomorphic attributes mentioned in the Qur’ân he interpreted away.

Ibn-Kullâb (d.c. 855) took this speculation a step further by positing for each adjectival attribute (sifa ma'nawiyya), such as “powerful” or “knowing”, a corresponding substantive attribute (sifa al-ma'nâ), such as “power” and “knowledge”.  Furthermore he distinguished attributes, such as all the foregoing which pertain to action, and attributes which describe God’s essence, such as “existence” or “eternity”.

Ibn-Kullâb had a student named al-Qalânisî who, using Kalâm to defend these and other Sunnite teachings, brought them to the attention of al-Ash'arî, who adopted them.

In the meantime Ibn-Karrâm (d. 869) in Persia tried to face the problem of the relationship between the eternal and the temporal, or the uncreated and the created.  He and his followers asserted that God was creator or creating (khâliq) through the attribute of creativeness (khâliqiyya) even before creatures existed.  This attribute they interpreted as a power over creation.  Yet when any creature comes into being, they said that this requires some change (hudűth) in God, which is the addition of the decision and command that the creature come into being.  Such a position was criticized in many quarters as leading to pantheism, since it sets up a continuity of mutual dependence between God and creatures.

Al-Ash'arî accepted the ideas of various kinds of attributes in God, distinct from one another and from God’s essence, but he himself did not systematize his teaching with the precision of later Ash'arites.

Al-Mâturîdî (d. 944), as noted in the previous chapter, differed from al-Ash'arî on some points.  One of them concerns the discussion on creation.  Al-Mâturîdî held that all attributes are eternal, while al-Ash'arî and his immediate followers said that the active attributes are not eternal; for instance God is creating only while creatures exist.

A late exponent of Ash'arite theology who has been very influential in North and West Africa is Muhammad ibn-Yűsuf as-Sanűsî (d. 1490).  In his Umm al-barâhîn or small catechism, he lists what has become the standard list of 20 attributes:

Among what is necessary to our Lord –the majestic and mighty– are twenty attributes.  These are: (1) existence (wujűd), (2) being from eternity (3) being everlasting, (4) otherness from things that come into being, (5) self-subsistency, that is, he does not need a subject-of-inherence nor a determining agency, (6) oneness, that is, there is no duplication of his essence, attributes or acts.  The first of these six attributes, existence, pertains to the essence itself (nafsiyya), whereas the other five are negative attributes (salbiyya).

Then the Most High necessarily possesses seven attributes called substantive attributes (sifât al-ma'ânî).  They are: (7) power and (8) will), which are related to all possible things, (9) knowledge, which is related to all necessary, admissible and impossible things, (10) life, which is related to nothing, (11) hearing and (12) sight, which are related to all existing things, and (13) speech, which is without letters or sound, and is related to the same things knowledge is related to.

[The most High necessarily possesses] seven attributes called adjectival attributes (sifât ma'nawiyya).  They follow upon the first seven, and are the Most High’s being: (14) powerful, (15) willing, (16) knowing, (17) living, (18) hearing, (19) seeing, and (20) speaking.

 



[1]Cf. Watt, The formative period, p. 283.