NIGERIA 1988
THE CHURCH AND ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA
IN THE 20TH CENTURY
(WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO NIGERIA)

(Paper for 1988 Bologna conference sponsored by Istituto per le scienze religiose and L'Ecole franēaise de Rome, published in French in Giuseppe Ruggieri, Eglise et histoire de l'église en Afrique (Paris: Beauchesne, 1988)

This paper continues the topic of the Church and Islam in West Africa, beginning roughly from the beginning of the colonial period. The colonial powers met in many places an established Islamic order. The transformation of Islamic social and political structures under colonial rule is of crucial importance in understanding the status and direction of Islam today, and will be considered first.

Next, passing over the story of the establishment of Christianity, we turn to the core of the paper, a comparative evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of Islam and Christianity today, since these are the foundation of their present and future relationships.

Lastly, I will review Christian-Muslim relations today. That will not be a detailed survey, but a summary and analysis of trends, with an attempt at prognosis.

Because of the limits of my personal experience the paper will be dominated by a Nigerian perspective. I apologize for this and ask the readers to make their own adjustments.

Islamic social and political structures

     Before colonialism

By way of introduction to the 20th century situation of Islam, I must briefly review the traditional Islamic structures in West Africa. This is only a sketch of what I have discussed more fully elsewhere. In talking of traditional Islamic structures in West Africa, we must be aware first that no society is completely and purely Islamic; there has always been accommodation with customary tradition or pragmatic compromises dictated by local necessity.

The most manifest form of Islamic structure was the Islamic state, where a ruler professes Islam and attempts to govern his people according to Sharī`a. Underlying this structure, preceding its establishment and surviving its destruction, however, is the more basic Islamic community known as jamā`a. Usually having Sūfic connections, it has a leader, variously called imām, shaykh, mallam, alfa or marabout. The community is at once a centre of religious practice and education, a self-sufficient economic unit, and a political party or miniature state, with the military means to defend itself and eventually move on to set up a full-fledged Islamic state.

There have always been Islamic jamā`as in West Africa, but there have not constantly been Islamic states. To have a state or empire, more is required than religion. There must be international economic conditions that provide the incentive for forming a state. In West Africa this incentive first came from the trans-Saharan trade, mainly in gold and in slaves. Empires arose to organize the markets, provide security for the supply routes and claim for the ruler a share in the profits in recompense for his services. As long as the demand in North Africa was high the Sudanic empires flourished. The imperial period of West Africa came to an end with the downfall of Songhay in 1592. This has been lamed on the Moroccan invasion, but for a long time no new state rose from the ashes of Songhay. Why was this? The apparent reason is the Turkish occupation of most of North Africa. The Turks, in their coastal strongholds, were Mediterranean in outlook and not interested in the Sahara and what lay beyond it. Trans-Saharan trade became less important; so the Sahelian states languished, except for Kanem-Borno which kept active links with Tripoli. Around the same time the Portuguese were opening new markets along the Atlantic coast. By the 17th century the British and the Dutch had moved full swing into the slave trade, stimulating the rise of coastal empires, such as Benin, Oyo, Dahomey and Ashanti, to organize and profit from this trade. The supply routes went well into the interior, drawing, for example, upon the captives of the wards between the Hausa states before the jihad of `Uthmān dan Fodiye. It was not long before the ripples of the Atlantic trade stimulated the formation of states in the interior which also wanted to profit form the trade. This, I submit, was the economic factor in the origin of the jihad states of the 18th and 19th centuries. The Atlantic had taken over from the Sahara as the long-distance trade focus of West Africa.

When the colonial powers entered West Africa, they met Muslim communities organized both in jamā`as and in Islamic states. As a general pattern, the French dismantled the Islamic states and neutralized the jamā`as so that they would work in cooperation with the colonial government. The British ignored the jamā`as, except for when they were suspected of Mahdism, but the defeated Islamic states they rehabilitated and utilized in the system of indirect rule.

     In the colonial and independent period

Both colonial and independent governments have held traditional Islamic structures in rein. Under the indirect rule system this actually meant an increase of real power for the emirs and district heads and a consequent extension of Islamic influence and conversion among their unassimilated subjects. But the institution of a parallel provincial government subject to regional and federal authority set the ground for a contest, form the beginning of self-government, in which the traditional authority was ultimately to lose all but its outward trappings.

In the independent period the emirs lost control of the police, the courts, prisons, tax collection, and finally became mere ceremonial figure-heads of their realms.

Alongside the marginalized traditional rulers, new structures evolved. The holders of the new officially secular offices were not above appealing to Islam to legitimize their rule and policies. Although certain traditional rulers, such as the Sultan of Sokoto, still retained enormous prestige, the real leadership of the Islamic community passed to the new politicians and commercial magnates who combined in political parties or an unofficial "mafia" to plan the destiny of the nation.

The new leadership has not been monolithic, but represents many competing tribal, sectional and personal interests. There is a political and economic national pie to be divided, and each interest wants its share. This is the strong secular dimension of the new leadership.

At this juncture we cannot afford to pass over the analysis of a group of thinkers at Ahmadu Bello University led by Yusufu Bala Usman. Although a scion of the Katsina royal family, Usman is a Marxist, but he does not claim the name. In a series of articles gathered in the book, The manipulation of religion in Nigeria 1977- 1987, he argues that religion and ethnicity are mere covers for politicians and commercial tycoons to act as agents of the exploitative Western neo-colonial economic system. They manipulate religious and ethnic sentiments to stir up irrational fears and tension to bolster their own positions and to weaken the country so that it may be more beholden to outside masters of the NATO block.

Yet the new leaders could not appeal to Islam if it were not a strong force in the lives of ordinary people. The ordinary people could well be ignored were it not for the fact that they too have their own jamā`a-type organizations. These include Sūfic organizations, especially the Tijāniyya, which are very influential in their respective constituencies, where they have ties with the traditional authorities. With their leaders' reputation for divine baraka, they also appeal to the people's traditional African religious sense of the sacred and the desire to have access to divine power.

Another form of jamā`a organization in recent times have been the Wahhābī inspired societies, the most notable of which is the Jamā`at izālat al-bid`a wa-iqāmat as-sunna, known commonly as the Izala. This group is iconoclastic in condemning all ūfic adaptations to African culture and all marks of respect paid to traditional authorities and elders. A similarly extremist jamā`a is a group called Shī`a, although the extent of their adoption of Shī`ite principles is uncertain. This group, dissident from traditional authority, is newly formed in Nigeria with the help of the Iranian embassy by students who had been in Iran.

Finally, there is the Maitatsine jamā`a, representing the frustrated marginalized poor of the cities and, to judge by their actions, guided by extreme Khārijite principles. To them both the traditional authorities and the Muslim politicians have betrayed Islam and so deserve death. Three bloody risings took place in 1980, 1982 and 1934 which were put down only by army bombardment. The movement was suppressed but may still survive underground. Little can be learned firsthand about it; allegations of heterodox Islamic teachings sound simply like devices to discredit them.

Looking at the countries ruled by France, we see that any Muslim personalities or organizations suspected of being subversive were banned, but other ūfic groups, such as the Murīds, were positively utilized both to ensure the loyalty of the Muslim population and to mobilize their energy for economic and educational development.

The attractions of Islam today

     Solidarity in a winning movement

The fundamental attraction of Islam must be religious, in the sense of relating people somehow to God and assuring them a happy destiny in the next life. But from the beginning Islam has operated on the strategy of a convinced elite group imposing itself on society and controlling the expression of opinion so that only Islamic ideology may be publicly tolerated until this ideology becomes second nature to the people.

The initial success of an Islamic coup or conquest depends upon its being popular, by bettering the lot of the people. In spite of initial looting and humiliating of conquered tribes and peoples, the peace and order that subsequently prevailed over a wide territory (except for slave reservoirs) was preferable to a state of constant inter-tribal or inter-clan raiding. Once the booty economy of conquest subsided, Islamic empires provided new opportunities for trade, which also gave the business community a vested interest in the continuation of the ruling power.

The ideology of Islam supports the expectation of success and triumph. Muslims are reminded that they are the best people raised up on earth, commanding the good and forbidding the evil. So solidarity with a winning cause is bolstered by a sense of pride and superiority.

Muslim faith is often tested by reverses in political fortune. Reverses are an occasion for unassimilated opposition to assert itself, particularly among the "hypocrites" who were forced to go along with the Islamic bandwagon. Right to the end of Muammad's life this movement was alive. It persisted for many years in North Africa until the conquest was irreversible. But once a Qur'ānic view takes over the culture of a people, reverses are attributed to the sins of the nation or as trials permitted by God for his own reasons. The backwardness and weakness of the Muslim world in recent centuries provoked some Muslims, from the late 19th century, to regard the status of their faith as retrogressive and imitate the non-Muslim developed world. Other Muslims were ready to use foreign modernities but at the same time found apologetic reasons for defending Islamic superiority.

One of these apologetic arguments is to say that the industrial world got its start by borrowing from the Arabs, and that the Muslims should now simply appropriate what is their own. Another argument is that all modern science is contained in the Qur'ān, if we would only understand; so Muslims are again simply using what is their own by right. A different sort of argument is to admit the material and technical inferiority of the Muslim world, but to assert its spiritual and moral superiority; this superiority will eventually give Muslims the lead in other matters.

Whatever rationalization a Muslim uses, Islam always drives him to hold his head high. In harmony with Calvinist ethics, a Muslim normally expects to have the best of this world and the best of the next.

     Economic solidarity

Productivity in Muslim areas is not generally notable. Traditional cottage or light industry rather than heavy industry and high technology prevail, although in mixed societies, such as the Yoruba, many Muslims are just as professional and productive as Christians.

On the other hand, in traditional Muslim societies trade has always been one area where Muslims excel. The basic structure of large trading networks and companies consists of agents who buy and sell in centres of production and consumption and in a transport system. Dependent on this basic structure is another network of clients: petty traders or distributors, guards, small boys who do loading, packing, tending animals and other miscellaneous jobs. Transport demands a basic investment in a fleet of lorries, but also provides jobs for drivers, attendants and mechanics. Along the route stopping points have grown into villages and towns or sections of older towns whose whole economy is to provide service for the lorries in transit. Participation in the trading network often depends on tribe (such as Hausa or Mande), but is open to others. The key to entry and bond of brotherhood is Islam. It is a fraternity quite like free-Masonry when it comes to mutual support and promotion. As a result, at each trade terminus and all along the way there are Muslim settlements with mosques and Qur'ānic schools. These settlements influence the local society and attract many of the indigens to participate in their economy and, of course, religion.

Apart from trade, many people have been won to Islam in northeastern Ghana through agricultural assistance by Muslims.

Another economic attraction for the Muslim of moderate means is the opportunity to go on pilgrimage and buy all sorts of goods for sale at a hefty profit back home, besides receiving gifts before and after.

     Traditional political/economic factors

Since the first contact of West Africa with Islam in the 8th century rulers welcomed the presence of Muslims, although only in the 11th century did they more important rulers actually become Muslim. The factors which influenced the islamization of West Africa then are to some extent still operative. The trans-Saharan export of gold was the mainstay of the economy of the Western Sahelian states, particularly ancient Ghana, while slaves were the main export of the central Sahelian states, particularly Kanem. Without this trade these states had no reason to exist as organized empires. The profits of the trade accrued mainly to the rulers and upper classes and these did everything they could to make their empires powerful, secure and efficient, so that they could attract Arab traders.

Arabic speaking North African traders snot only brought goods, but also services: a communication system in Arabic, whereby orders, credit and banking were possible to any point in West and North Africa. Another service was medicine. This included a smattering of medieval medical lore derived from Ibn-Sīnā (such as cupping), but in the main consisted of charms. Although of questionable legitimacy according to certain reformists, these competed seriously with traditional medicine.

There was plenty of incentive for a ruler not only to welcome Muslims but also to become a Muslim. It gave him a position of trust and prestige and brotherhood with his trading partners which he could never have as a non-Muslim.

Also, once a number of his own people became Muslim through involvement in the Muslim trading system, the ruler would feel obliged to accept Islam so as to retain his authority over these influential people. this does not mean that he would abandon the traditional religion of the majority of the people. He would practice the two side by side, so as to be a father of all.

For a multi-ethnic empire Islam served the further purpose of providing a unifying ideology, orderly laws and legitimacy for the dispensers of these laws.

Another factor compelling the ruler to accept Islam was to preempt being attacked by neighbouring Muslim powers. It is not permitted for Muslims to attack Muslims, but they may attack non-Muslims or apostates to compel them to accept Islamic rule. In practice this gave religious justification to raids which would have been carried on for independent reasons, such as for food, slaves or control of trade routes. Arab or Berber forces seldom made direct war on Sahelian states, but intervened by supporting Muslim states against non-Muslims.

     Politics and economy in the present time

Politics and economy are closely connected in any society and there is always some amount of patronage in contracts. In West African states the corruption that usually goes with this is more obvious and blatant than in Europe or America where it is covered by legal subterfuge.

The traditional economy in West Africa was private enterprise heavily indebted to and exploited by chieftaincies, and in modern times by the civil or military governments. In the few places (like Benin Republic) where a socialist economy is attempted, to the extent that it inhibits private initiative the economy does not really succeed; moreover the government itself becomes the corrupt distributor of patronage. Muslim societies in West Africa share all these problems and habits of non-Muslim societies. In addition, religious solidarity guides the distribution of patronage. Contracts, appointments, promotions go first to Muslims if there are non-Muslims also competing. Also the wealth of the Muslim leaders predominantly comes from controlling distribution rather than from production.

     Social and cultural advantages

Islam is a high profile religion. Mosques are put on main roads or sites where they can be seen. Loudspeakers make sure they are heard. Festivities take place where they will be seen and noticed. The daily alāt is performed on the streets, in public buildings and work places. Muslims display their Islam by distinctive and splendid dress. Alms are begged and given in a way that calls people's attention. Everywhere the message is: "I am proud to be a Muslim."

A short term attraction to Islam is that it demands less of human nature in some basic areas. In marriage four wives are permitted, with easy divorce, and, by law at any rate, slave girls without limit. (Nowadays girls are "given" as tribute to important men.) Revenge is permitted, and righteous self-assertion, particularly in relation to non-Muslims, normally surfaces in cases of tension.

In its initial stage Islam tolerates many of the practices of the traditional religion, although a stage usually comes when these are questioned and rejected, but later toyed with.

The greatest social attraction of Islam is its community solidarity. It is a super-tribe, a party of people who share what they have, practice hospitality and take care of their own. Particularly in its ūfic societies, it can be a needed home away from home for an African outside his own village.

In some places, as Luc Moreau observes, where Islam is not so tightly controlled by Sharī`a, it has accommodated traditional clan and family structures, accepting not only polygamy but also the values of achieving fame and prosperity as the head of a large household and extended family. In the transition from village to city life Islam is a convenient bridge. This was true of some French ruled places and, in colonial times, to parts of Yorubaland, but seems less strong today.

Moreau gives two other social factors which make Islam attractive to Africans, which seem more generally valid. The first is that, in spite of being a Scripturary religion, Islam relies primarily on oral preaching. The Qur'ān was originally addressed in an oral form to people who generally were illiterate. We need not be reminded that, even where literacy is general, African culture stresses speech far more than writing. Stories of the past and warnings about the future are not far from the patterns of traditional lore.

The second point of convergence noted by Moreau is the fact that the Qur'ān is addressed to an animist culture. Even while condemning polytheism, it accepts the existence of good and evil jinn and their influence in the world, and admits that dreams and visions are real contact with the spiritual world. However remote it may be from orthodox Islam, going to specialists for divination and charms for every purpose is akin to almost universal African tradition.

     Religious attraction

The ultimate or fundamental legitimacy of Islam stems from the claim that it relates a person correctly to his Creator. Something may be said for the view of Horton that social changes exposing the African to a wider cosmopolitan world dispose him towards a religion that focuses on the one supreme God rather than the parochial deities and ancestors who are accessible only in a village context. Allah is an umbrella deity who governs the whole world and can be called upon anywhere. In this case a proper relationship to Allah is all the more important.

The common Muslim view is that Islamic faith by itself alone justifies a person. The relationship between faith and deeds has long been debated, but the common Sunnī position is that Islamic faith assures a Muslim of eventually going to Paradise, no matter what crimes he has committed, although he will pay for these by a temporary stay in Hell.

Guilt over sins still pursues many Muslims, but this is attenuated by the belief that good deeds compensate for evil ones and that Muammad will intercede for his followers that they may be forgiven (a belief rejected by the Wahhābīs/Izāla). In Muslim prayers petition for forgiveness is a prominent theme. On the positive side, while Muslim theologians (e.g. al-Ghazālī) allow the possibility that Christians invincibly ignorant of Islam can enter Paradise, Muslims are convinced that they have the final and perfect religion. The assurance that they are God's chosen people enables them to face death, suffering and the difficulties of life with equanimity. God has destined everything and will eventually make his own triumph. God normally gives his people success in this life, but if for some reason he does not, Muslims can expect heavenly reward in proportion to a person's good deeds in this life. The Qur'ān describes a sensuous Paradise, but it is hard to assess how the concrete Qur'ānic descriptions actually motivate Muslims here and now. Among Islamic ceremonies, alāt is attractive because Africans are habituated to expressing themselves through motion, dance or ritual action. By doing alāt with all its bodily action one feels he has accomplished something and merited a fitting reward.

Ramadān observances attract not because of the negative aspect of fasting, but because of the heavenly reward expected for doing something difficult and the night social gatherings and festivities and collective break from routine. The values of appreciating the plight of the poor and, above all, of meriting a heavenly reward are stressed by modernist Muslims.

Making the hajj has commercial side benefits, but is also appreciated as an accomplishment of one of the major duties of religion which bring God's favour and blessing, both for the next world and this world. Some see the ajj primarily as an occasion for having their sins forgiven. An "al-hajji" has great prestige and respect on his return, and attributes his subsequent prosperity and success and other blessings to his having made the hajj. Some rich men sponsor others to go with them or in their stead, thereby hoping to share in the baraka of those they sponsor.

To tap divine power is one of the main expectations Muslims have of their religion, as is the case for many Christians and followers of traditional religion. One way they believe they tap God's power is by following the injunctions and rituals of religion. Another way is popular Islamic medicine. Although disapproved by some reformist Muslims, charms and amulets are available for every intention, from getting health, money or a lover, to killing one's enemies. These take many grotesque and cabalistic forms, but usually utilize certain Qur'ān verses.

The Qur'ān itself is considered the most powerful medicine. Certain sūras, like Yā Sīn, are read or kept as efficacious medicine. Qur'ān verses written on slates are washed and the ink drunk as medicine. Even recited, or better chanted, the Qur'ān sounds like an incantation. It seems all the more powerful because it is written in a mysterious language. Even if it is learned and understood, it contains mysterious letters and oaths which suggest a unique divine efficacy.

Islamic teachings have an appeal because of the simplicity of its dogmas and basic demands, even though Islamic law is very complicated. The idea of a single God speaking through a definitive prophet is easy to grasp, and Muslim apologists boast that Islam teaches no mysteries. This is not to say, however, that all that Islam or the Qur'ān teaches is self-evident. This was the case at the beginning of Muammad's preaching ,when he presented himself simply as a "warner" or a "reminder", but as time went on he became an oracle of truth when the evidence was incomplete or absent. Take the case of `Ā'isha's innocence or Qur'ānic narratives of Old Testament events which claim God's revelation as their source. Nevertheless, a blind or fundamentalist acceptance of Muammad's prophetic word is itself a simple position to take. Truth and falsehood are like white and black, and such simplism attracts many people.

Muhammad himself is presented officially as simply a mortal conveyer of God's message, but Islamic theology views him as the first of God's creation (in the form of light), the perfect man and ethical model for all mankind for all time. He himself is Sunna, another form of revelation alongside the Qur'ān. Besides this, he is the eschatological intercessor who will deliver sinful Muslims form the punishment of Hell. In popular Islam, therefore, his person enjoys the highest reverence. Africans who do not want to be left out of any good opportunity might think they have nothing to lose and everything to gain by identifying with this important personality.

They have nothing to lose because Islam seems to have all the good that other religions have: the major Old and New Testament figures are all there in place of honour. Little does it matter that their sole function is to legitimize Muhammad's position by appearing on the same platform with him as his supporters and ancestors in faith. They have no authority of their own, but must fade away like so many John the Baptists. Yet the presence in the Qur'ān of Adam, Abraham, Moses, Joseph (OT), David, Zachariah, Mary and Jesus invites those who have heard good things of these persons to join Islam. At the same time it gives Muslims a limited immunity against Christianity by inoculating them with a touch of its most potent elements.

The ease by which one becomes a Muslim is another attraction. There is no catechumenate or test to be undergone, just the profession of the shahāda, usually before an imām. Also Islam is loosely organized, with little supervision or control. The clergy is not ordained, but take their authority simply from their learning.

     Methods

Islam spreads spontaneously through all the attractions listed above. In addition, zealous Muslims and those who utilize Islam for other ends systematically exploit some of these features. Usually Muslims try to spread from the top, by creating favourable relationships with chiefs and those in authority. Once the chiefs are won, the next step is to merge tribal and Islamic loyalty. Sometimes, however, it spreads from the bottom, usually by mobilizing a people of one profession (e.g. traders in Liberia) or tribe (e.g. the Fulani) to become a force the government has to reckon with and eventually grant concessions to.

Patronage is used as both a stick and a carrot: People can be punitively denied jobs and amenities because they do not join or cooperate. On the other hand great magnanimity and generosity can be shown to prospective converts, with a minimum of pressure, just a gentle hint that they would be welcome to join the fold. Such converts then feel they are joining freely and with dignity.

Patronage takes many forms, form jobs to promotions, appointments, contracts, allocation of infra-structural amenities to one's community, and wives. A man must be a Muslim to marry a Muslim girl. Besides, some Muslim men make it a point to marry educated Christian girls who can grace public occasions by their presence. They are offered the prospect of money and a comfortable life without being forced to become Muslim, although in the course of time this is the usual step they take.

Muslims can find Qur'ānic support for winning converts by gifts in the phrase "mu'allafatu qulūbu-hum" (3:60 among the beneficiaries of zakāt.

The triumphal character of Islam is used to give the impression that the Muslims have the upper hand. Every chance is used to make Islam seen and heard, even when it is annoying, as the morning harangues on loudspeakers between the first and second calls for prayer.

Muslims have been systematically trying to spread their presence to every corner of Nigeria and West Africa. Mosques and schools keep appearing in the most unlikely places, as in the heart of Igboland, and Igbo youth are offered money to come for training in a commune in Kaduna.

When Islam has the upper hand, but still does not have a large number or even the majority of the people, Muslim leaders often feel threatened and try by all means to consolidate power. By definition, an Islamic state has only one party, that of Islam. Divergence of views may be tolerated, but only under the umbrella of Islam, and this fundamental ideology may not be challenged in public. The principal strategy of Muslim leaders in such places as Nigeria today is to muzzle the Churches, even at the expense of partially silencing Muslims. It seems one of the main aims of religious disturbances is to provoke the government into a general restriction of all religions, so as to stop Christian evangelism and pronouncements about the trend of events in the country. In Nigeria Muslims control or exploit the public media, such as national TV and the government press, for the exaltation of Islam. Independent publications, such as Newswatch, which are critical of many things, including the trend towards Islamic totalitarianism, are subjected to harassment and sometimes shut down. On the other hand, Islamic oriented publications, such as Community Concord (owned by Abiola) or The Pen (owned by Tofa), are promoted widely without hinderance.

The pilgrimage has strategic advantages as well as spiritual and material benefits. It is an exchange point for ideas and movements from all over the Muslim world. Islamic revival movements and plans for financial and military assistance are diffused on this annual occasion. As a demonstration of world Islamic solidarity acting as a sort of confirmation for Muslims, the ajj provides concrete means and methods for the pilgrims to become true soldiers of Islam. It provides the motivation "to command the good and forbid evil" and enforce this in an organized way: internally by the institution of itisāb, or self-policing and informing, and externally by jihād. a few muslim organizations have already been mentioned. Another radically oriented group (like the Izāla) is the Muslim Student Society. But there are many moderate organizations such as Ansar ad-deen, which promote Islam and the interests of their members by education and other forms of self-help.

Another Muslim strategy, which appeals only to a minority of Muslims, is to push for the full institution of Sharī`a, equivalently making Nigeria an Islamic state. The argument is always that Sharī`a is a panacea for all the ills of society and if it is only instituted and enforce Utopia will have come.

The attractions of Christianity

Islam should not be assumed to be more attractive or, as is often said, more African than Christianity. Some of the factors mentioned concerning Islam operate in favour of Christianity, while Christianity has some unique advantages.

     Economy/ education

The Church has led education in West Africa. Its schools were means of conversion only because of the intense desire of the people for education. the Church's contribution to education has established its reputation as a progressive force for the advancement and development of the people. The schools have mostly been taken over by the governments, partly from a Muslim desire to check the Church. But the liberal attitudes that education inculcates have become an indelible part of the consciousness of the millions who have been exposed to it. Hospitals and clinics have long demonstrated the compassion of the Church, even though they have not been means of winning many converts. More recently and to a much lesser extent the Church has been involved in other projects of social development, such as agriculture, water supply, crafts etc. These have helped foster the image of the Church as progressive, and they do attract people.

Christian education and aid has primarily helped develop a professional class and people equipped with various productive skills. In some areas these Christians are just a work pool for Muslims who control the economy. Elsewhere they are in business and well off. Much depends on how contract patronage is distributed. The Church rejects the entire idea of using patronage to win converts. Besides, it has less money for the promotion of Christianity than Muslims do for the promotion of Islam. This may be because Muslims, especially rich ones, are more generous, or it may be because Islam has government funds at its disposal, as well as grants from foreign governments, which have much more than what Propaganda Fidei or Missio can muster. One Muslim leader confided to me that the foreign aid given to the Muslim community has created the impression among ordinary Muslims that every Islamic project is very well funded and the people do not need to contribute anything. Because Christian projects get much less from funding agencies and wealthy philanthropists, African Christians have a much greater sense of their own responsibility for the financial needs of the Church.

     Political involvement

Christians have been notably behind Muslims in the art of politics, in Nigeria at any rate. Where they are involved, the interests of Christianity are usually far in the background. This stems sometimes from these politicians' low level of commitment to Christianity, but also from Christian teaching that religion and state should be separate and that politicians should serve all the people without discrimination. But the Church has been negligent in the formation of lay leaders who would be involved in politics and have a strong interest in promoting social justice and defending the civil rights of the Church, without discriminating against other religions.

In questions of Church and human rights bishops have made approaches to governments and sometimes come into open conflict. Muslim leaders have been far more vocal, almost always when the interests of Islam are concerned. I know of one exception, the imām of the Farfaru mosque in Sokoto who spoke against Shagari's expulsion of the Ghanaians and has come out on other issues of justice in the nation that do not affect Muslims primarily.

     Culture

Christianity of its nature is incarnational, and therefore translates itself in every place: not just the Bible, but every aspect of its life. Islam, on the other hand, descends from above as a complete system of life and culture and simply displaces what was there before.

This general difference gives Christianity an edge over Islam, even though in particular instances Islam is more accommodating, for example in the number of wives and divorce. In this area Christianity benefits from the image of being progressive, in standing for some of the right demands of the feminist movement. The Church is likewise comfortable with a secular society, having learned from historical circumstances and theological reflection to respect its proper autonomy. Muslims often experience tension in going along with secular customs, which they assume to be Christian or otherwise alien.

Christian healing prayer is a phenomenon which was not prominent in the missionary stage of the Church in West Africa. It developed among Aladura movements and lately, through the Charismatic movement, to the Catholic and other older Churches. It has a very high influence on the masses of people, so much so that Muslim imitations have begun to emerge, with choruses, dancing and invitations for people to come and get their miracle. These imitations, however, have no chance of having anywhere near the impact of the Christian healing movements.

While Christian healing prayer is an enormously strong initial attraction, there is also an enormous gap between this initial interest and conversion to an authentic committed Christianity, just as the crowds who followed Jesus for bread and miracles had far to go to have real faith in him. The scene is complicated by the presence of charlatan evangelists, imitating the American TV evangelists, who exploit the faith of the people to make money. These are a real danger for leading Christians astray.

     Religious attraction

Christian worship adapts to local culture as Islam would never do. For this reason it is far more popular. Qur'ān chanting over loudspeakers is a poor match for the vivacity of Christian singing. Even Christian use of foreign art forms, such as certain hymns or religious concert music, in an appropriate context is a positive attraction, since people want a taste of foreign masterpieces as well as their own productions. The central teaching of Christianity, that we are initiated through Jesus into intimacy with the Father, and that this union includes our relationship with one another, is extremely potent and far reaching. It is constantly preached in many different forms throughout the liturgical year, and is the basic glue that will make Christianity stick.

Where people fail to grasp this teaching, for instance by seeing Jesus as just another moral teacher or prophet, little will hold them from jumping to Islam if it is presented in an attractive package. The Church as the body of Christ and extended family of God gives people a sense of belonging and acceptance which they need when they are uprooted from village culture and thrust into a changing urban society. The sacraments are another aspect of the Church which show its incarnational character. These rituals are appealing to people coming from a background of African traditional religion.

Comparison of results

     Islam

Islam has had an active presence in West Africa centuries longer than Christianity. It has had the political support of colonial and independent governments. Over this century it has been constantly spreading its presence over more and more places in West Africa. The process continues now as much as ever. Older cities like Ibadan and Lagos are being given an Islamic appearance. Minarets multiply and grow taller and microphones proliferate.

During all this time the political clout of Islam has also become constantly stronger. Likewise there is no doubt that this century has seen a huge increase in terms of real numbers and in the proportion of Muslims to the whole population. Yet this great expansion seems, for Nigeria at least, confined to the period of colonialism. The independent period has been a period of slow growth in some areas, standstill in other, and actually reverse in some others. A detailed survey would be needed to formulate any statistical graph. Yet much of the religious tension in Nigeria is the result of the panic at an erosion of Muslim power and hold over the people.

     Christianity

Christian mission in West Africa began in the 15h century, but significant spread of the Church began only in the late 19th. Since then it has continued to increase up to the present time. IN many areas where there are no more formal adherents of the traditional religion the Church is not increasing in numbers, but in some newly reached areas it still spreads like wild fire.

Generally, wherever Christianity and Islam have had a free hand among followers of traditional religion, Christianity has won the people. Such has been the case of most of northern Nigeria since independence. Only where Christianity was slow in coming or its work was severely curtailed by the Muslim government has Islam been more successful, for example in several areas of Sokoto State.

     Statistics

Not having access to complete or recent data, I nevertheless think it useful to summarize in percentages Cuoq's data which comes from the late 1960s:

Senegal82.6%                        Gambia86%
Guinée-Bissau40%Guinée75%
Sierra Leone50%Liberia26%
Mali68%Niger85%
Bourkina Faso17%Ivory Coast21.7%
Ghana12%Nigeria44%

Since the time of these figures vast numbers of followers of traditional religion have become Christian, particularly in Nigeria.

Christian-Muslim relations in West Africa

     Christian attitudes

The missionary policy of the early Portuguese in West Africa included the aim of containing the spread of Islam globally, and in Africa in particular. This same intention was in the background of much of the 19th and 20th century missionary movement.

Yet we must put this "containment" attitude in perspective. There is hardly a Christian missionary who would not welcome a spontaneous, sincere movement of Muslims to Christianity, even though some would have hesitations about individual conversions where this would upset relations between the two communities. In fact, missions to convert Muslims were few and short-lived. The rapid general perception that Muslims, even in Black Africa where Islam was believed to be superficial and watered down, are for the most part resistant to conversion became an assumption and an operating principle of most missionaries in the 20th century, whether Catholic or Protestant. If there was any sense of containing Islam it was translated into an effort to introduce Christianity to the non-Muslim peoples before they were seduced by Islam. Even here, there was little general paranoia about the Islamic menace. Missionaries concentrated on their job with the non-Muslims at hand and mostly ignored the Muslims, unless, for example, the Muslims sent their children to Christian schools accepting that they would be trained to be Christians. That has been the general situation in Nigeria at any rate. In some other countries, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and some of the French ruled territories, it was possible to minister directly to Muslims, mainly through schools, without expecting the students to enter a catechumenate and sometimes not even a course on Christian knowledge. The products of these schools are Muslims with Christian sympathies and relations between Christians and Muslims in such cases are quite good.

In Kano St. Louis is the best school for girls and has about 80% Muslim students, including the daughters of the most prominent Muslims in the state. That played an important role in countering an attempt to take over the school from the sisters. Unfortunately in Nigeria such Christian-Muslim cooperation is an exception to the general stand-off relationship of the two communities.

In the early Victorian period of colonialism the British government overtly espoused a religious ideology of stopping slavery and oppression, promoting economic development and trade and making education available for Africans in the name of Christianity. Later "Christianity" gave way to secular humanitarianism. In either case, we know how this is now all dismissed as a mere sham and cover for the aim of exploiting Africa for the benefit of Britain, whether the consequences upon Africa were beneficial or not. But we cannot dismiss the sincerity of abolitionists and missionaries who rode the crest of this movement and sacrificed themselves to share not only their faith but also all their abilities and know-how with Africans. We can accuse them of sharing or imposing alien cultural attitudes at the same time, but for all the vociferation about this we only have to observe how Africans, for better or worse, have either eagerly appropriated or have filtered out numberless British idiosyncrasies. We know too how in recent years self-criticism has reached an all time high (at least in Nigeria) and that there is strong opinion for adopting, with discrimination of course, further values of Western civilization which are lacking in Africa.

Alongside the condescending attitude of most early colonialists and missionaries there were some who showed a positive active interest in the Muslim community. We think of Edward Wilmot Blyden and his associates in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, who attempted a perhaps naive harmonization of Christian and Muslim interests, but there were others as well, as evidenced by the testimony of William Maude, one of a host of ordinary Protestant missionaries of a similar mind. Around 1917 he said:

The evangelism of West Africa does not depend on what Muhammedanism may be doing, although if Mohammedanism can provoke and shame the Christian Church into doing its duty, that is something to the good. Whether in any other way Islam prepares the way for Christianity may be doubted but I think it should be recognised that it is at least an advance on paganism... Force and cruelty are no longer being used to spread Islam... The Mohammedan teacher is everywhere. He needs no society behind him, no funds to sustain him.

It would be interesting if sociological questionnaires had been administered on the attitudes of missionaries throughout the 20th century, but there have been none, and it is impossible to reconstruct a representative survey on the basis of off-hand remarks in scattered letters or reports.

What we do have, however, are policy statements of Churches or mission bodies. Even these may be more ad hoc pragmatic observations rather than studied theological and pastoral reflections, such as developed in the Catholic Church as a prelude to and outgrowth of Vatican II. Notable among the latter documents at the regional level is the statement of AECAWA in October 1986.

     Muslim attitudes

In the first part of this paper we saw the different organizational structures governing the various segments of the Muslim community. Here we will look at the different attitudes these groups have towards Christians and Christian communities.

First there are the people attached to traditional emirate or Sūfic structures. A fundamental characteristic of this group is the traditional Arab virtue of adab, which is a gentlemanly politeness which is never insulting or rude, and maintains all the appearances of fairness. A representative of this group would never say no to a Christian request or invitation; if he were adverse to cooperating he would simply not comply and give some excuse later. Left to themselves, this group would simply apply the discriminatory terms of the "Covenant of `Umar" to the Christians. In practice they give them better treatment, because they do not want trouble from any source, and because they want the advantages that Christians have to offer. By their warnings and other pressure the traditional Muslim authorities tried to negate the influence of Christian missionaries among the rural non-Muslim population. They succeeded to a large extent in areas where their influence was strong, such as in Sokoto State, but elsewhere their reprisals or threats had little deterrent effect.

The second group are extremists, represented especially by the Izāla and their leader, Abubakar Gummi. These recognize nothing but the Qur'ān as the constitution of the country. They insist on the divine right of Muslim ascendency over all others and a rigid observance of Sharī`a in public life. Gummi's preaching has resulted in the widespread adoption of the veil by Muslim women in Kaduna and elsewhere, and the banning of alcohol in many places. Their contempt for traditional African respect for chiefs and elders alienates other Muslims, so much so that in the local elections in Kaduna early in 1988 Muslim leaders advised their people to vote for Christians rather than Izāla candidates. This assured the victory of a Christian woman as chairman of the local government in the Kaduna constituency where Gummi lives.

Another type of Muslim is represented by the tolerant Yoruba. Yoruba people are particularly attached to their own traditions, and family unity is stronger than religious divisiveness. There is, however, a range of the degree of attachment to Islam. Some approach fanaticism in fostering polarity and a persecution complex among the Muslims. Since the late 1970s many Yoruba mosques began to mount loudspeakers over which they subjected the surrounding people to long harangues between the two morning calls for prayer. At the same time came a campaign demanding Islamic instruction in all schools (taken over form the Churches by the government in the early 1970s) and complaining over remaining Christian influence in schools and elsewhere. In 19877 came the cross controversy at the University of Ibadan, where the Muslims demanded the removal of the concrete cross between the Catholic and Protestant chapels, since it overlooked their new mosque.

In the middle are the majority of Yoruba Muslims who are deeply attached to and delight in Muslim ceremonies, pilgrimages etc., yet at the same time share life fully with their Christian brethren, even patronizing church fund raising drives and taking part in Christian feasts.

On the other end of the spectrum are those who are quite religious but not strongly attached to Islam as the only true religion. They are quite willing to experiment elsewhere, and many of them become Christians or at least allow their children to do so.

Outside Nigeria West Africa has seen a more tolerant attitude prevail, that is, until recently. Fundamentalist political activism has been fostered by Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Libya has recruited for the Islamic Legion in Borno State, adjoining Chad. In Senegal the rise of fundamentalism is denied by government officials and dismissed as a concoction of the Western press or crusading Christians. Any Christian apprehension is thus condemned in advance as subversive. In appealing for an Islamic state the fundamentalists appeal to the principle of democracy and point to the fact that Senegal is 98% Muslim. Democracy for them means majority rule, not pluralism with voice for all. They also are unhappy about Christian schools, even though Muslim parents prefer them for their academic excellence and religious atmosphere, and even though conversion to Christianity is rare and not a danger. They would like to turn these schools into Islamic schools, where Christians are exempted from Islamic instruction but at the same time marginalized in the school. More and more young people returning from school in other Muslim countries and not finding employment are looking for easy answers in religious fanaticism. As in Nigeria, the Sūfic traditionalists are the only force blocking this movement form overwhelming the government.

In Gambia too, Muslims have recently moved into the educational field but, not content with establishing their own schools, have demanded that all other schools should have Islamic religious instruction with the same exempt but marginalized status for Christian students. As discrimination emerges in the political and other spheres of life with no possibility of Christian resistance, the Christians keep silent, for fear of being accused of scare-mongering.

In other countries of a large Muslim majority, such as Mali and Niger, the situation is somewhat parallel. Christians have enjoyed a good measure of tolerance, but must tread softly and endure discrimination silently if they do not want to provoke a backlash.

In Ghana, where Muslims are a minority, the situation contrasts sharply with the countries just mentioned. Muslims must find it hard to believe the amount of freedom they have where religious pluralism genuinely prevails. Yet they, as a community are less concerned with the nation as a whole that with the gains of their own community and links with Arab states.

Benin Republic has a sizable Muslim minority in the North. The country was subjected to Islamic pressure from Ghaddafi, but this provoked a negative reaction. Relations between Christians and Muslims here are rather good. The same can be said of Ivory coast.

Further field research would be necessary to assess the situation over the whole of West Africa.

Conclusion

For a long time the attitude of the Churches to Islam in Africa has been dominated by a feeling that Christianity is at a serious disadvantage, that Islam is sweeping the continent and there is little Christians can do about it. This may have been true of one or another area at some time, but the general picture today is very much the opposite. The Church, if not actually gaining, is at least equipped with far better resources than Islam for attracting Africans. Particularly, the myth that Islam is more African is no longer tenable.

If this is true, the Church, while remaining vigilant and energetic, has no reason for being fearful or panicky before Islam. If such fear is put to rest, the Church will be in a better position to embark upon dialogue with the Muslim community and can better take into account and sympathize with the less well prepared situation of the Muslims.

Some writers, such as Lamin Sanneh, look to the common heritage of African traditional religion, with its tolerant family spirit, as a foundation for harmony between Christians and muslims. Others may not see traditional culture and religion as strong enough a force to conciliate the giants of Islam and Christianity. But if we believe that God was at work in the faith of our African forebears, then we may believe that he was providing them with the resources to deal with the tussle between the great incoming religions. Christians, at any rate, believe that the Gospel can give the necessary force to traditional thought and living values to make them sufficient for handling the problems of religious tolerance today.

The future looks bright for Christianity in West Africa. It is equally certain that Islam will remain strong. Good future relations between the communities depend less on the future growth and consolidation of these communities than upon the free choice of their leaders and members to foster good relations.

APPENDIX SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The status of Islam

     Population statistics

Muslims seem to be at most 40% of the total population and at least 30%. The 1963 census (the last accepted) give 43% and this was questionable even then. Christian advances have been much more spectacular than those of Muslims since then, but no reliable figures are available.

     Tendencies

Fundamentalist: Represented by the Izala (Jamā`at izāla al-bid`a wa-iqāma as-sunna), championed by Abubakar Gummi.

Sufic organizations, especially the Tijaniyya, are more moderate, of a mind with the traditional rulers.

Secularizing currents: socialist (Yusuf Bala Usman and associates in Kaduna and Kano) or capitalist ("Mafia" businessmen).

     Growth of Islam

Islam is not growing much in numbers, except by natural increase or by "buying" certain upwardly mobile Christians in the North. Muslims are, however, extending the visibility of Islam and showing their power, claiming "rights" such as Sharī`a courts. They use the army leadership to get privileges. In fact, the political developments are not going in their favour. In the local government elections held throughout the country Christians gained the upper hand in many former Islamic strongholds, such as Kaduna.

     Outside Islamic influence

The issue of O.I.C. has been mute over the past year, with no formal repudiation of Nigeria's membership nor any firm news of continuing participation in the organization's activities. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran continue to fund and promote fundamentalist tendencies, with Libya supporting the Islamic Legion in Borno State.

Attitudes of the Muslim community

     Toward Christians in general

There is stiff rivalry with Christians, in an attempt to institutionalize Islam in the country at all levels. Muslim fundamentalists insist that a Muslim must rule Nigeria, and do so according to Islamic law. They are holding the government to ransom to get gestures of support. Gummi, even after his role in the riots of last year, was sent on hajj this year with the official government delegation. These people demand most and are most opposed to Christian interests. Others, however, for example, M.O. Opeloye, in the latest issue of BICMURA (6:2, April 1988), actually repudiate such confrontation and the imposition of Sharī`a, at least at the federal level. Most ordinary Muslims are friendly and not confrontational. Confrontation is usually a masque for political ambition.

     Towards the Catholic Church

The Catholic Church is a member of CAN (Christian Association of Nigeria) and in this association is now recognized by other denominations as the leader and spokesman for all the Churches in the struggle against Muslim encroachment. Archbishop Okogie is the loudest voice, and extremist Muslims see him as their adversary. The Church has few institutions, such as schools, that could threaten Islam.

     Muslim study of Christianity

There are no Muslim centres specifically for the study of Christianity or Christian culture. Only in the universities do Muslims have a chance to see some objective history (especially in A.B.U.) or take courses in Christianity (as at the University of Ibadan).

Attitude of the Church

Towards Muslims, their organizations and social structures

Over the years the Church has tended to ignore the Muslims except when they obstructed Church life or evangelization of followers of traditional religion. The past few years have seen ever increasing tension with Muslim leaders. The Church has been outspoken, not only in its leadership but more importantly on the level of the laity. A united and planned effort of the Christian laity (together with some Protestant clergy) to safeguard Christian freedoms has been very effective in mobilizing the people, among other things, to defeat Muslim extremists in local elections. (Note also that moderate Muslim preachers in the Kaduna mosques appealed to their people to vote for Christians rather than Muslim extremists.)

     Christian study centres of Islam

The only scientific centre of note for Christian study of Islam is the Dominican Islamic library in Ibadan. It has over 3,000 catalogued items besides periodicals. It is utilized mainly by staff and graduate students of the University of Ibadan. The regional Pastoral Centre in Jos has begun to collect some documents. There is also a fair collection of documents in the library of the Theological College of Northern Nigeria (Protestant) in Bukuru, near Jos. Other research materials can be found in university libraries, particularly in the University of Ibadan (Centre of Arabic Documentation), A.B.U. in Zaria, and in Kano and Sokoto. There are also valuable materials in the various branches of the National Archives and in private Muslim libraries.

Pastoral plans and initiatives of the bishops

     Contacts, structures for dialogue, results

Bishop Onaiyekan has spoken at a number of meetings with Muslims. As for Christian Islamicists, there is Fr. Victor Chukwulozie, correspondent with the Secretariat and lecturer in the University of Nigeria Nsukka, Joseph Kenny OP in Ibadan, Igba Vishigh OP in Gusau (preparing a Ph.D. on Islam at the University of Jos), Fr. Jarlath Walsh SMA at the Pastoral Centre in Jos, and Fr. Didam, also in Jos. Tow other young priests are studying Islam in Rome, from the Archdioceses of Onitsha and Kaduna. Mention should be made of two non- Catholic Islamicists with whom these men cooperate: Pastor S.B. Mala at the University of Ibadan (Christ Apostolic Church) and Immanuel Oyelade at the University of Ife (Baptist).

     Concrete problems

Up till now there is no episcopal "plan" at any level for dealing with Muslims. There is not even a national or regional commission for relations with Muslims, and most of the above mentioned priests' involvement with Muslims and interest in Islam is on a purely private basis, with no communication about it whatsoever with the bishops. The need to monitor Islam in all parts of Nigeria and pool the information has not yet been recognized. In the words of Bishop Ganaka (speaking for the Northern bishops) to the Dominican Vice- Provincial on 11 Sept. 1979 (his last communication), "the Bishops of the Kaduna Province have no intention of continuing the type of dialogue with the type of Moslems in the province that will warrant a full timer..." More specifically, "We in the Diocese of Jos have never had the intention of inviting the Dominicans particularly of your province to work for the Diocese of Jos."

     Conversion statistics

Precise statistics about conversions one way or the other are not available, since there is no one to gather them. Yet from general information, conversions to Islam are few, and for opportunistic motives, to judge from known cases. Conversions to Christianity are far more common, particularly, but not only, in the South. Formerly conversions came mostly through schools. After the schools were taken over conversions have continued through direct evangelistic efforts, particularly by non-Catholic Christians. These conversions are one of the causes of the present tension between the communities.

     Marriages between Christians and Muslims

There are likewise no accurate statistics about mixed marriages, yet they are common everywhere Christians and Muslims live together. It has been alleged that Muslims urge their young men to marry Christian girls to convert them and extend Islam in this way. But Christian girls do not always or even generally convert, and where they continue to practice their Christian faith they generally raise their children Christian also. In spite of Islamic law, Christian men do marry Muslim girls. Most often these girls become Christians, but not always. The mother then sometimes raises the children Muslim.

Suggestions

The Nigerian Church should have a commission for relations with Muslims and to relate with the corresponding non-Catholic body, "Project for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa" (PROCMURA, formerly "Islam in Africa Project"). The Association of West African English-speaking Episcopal Conferences already has a commission, even though it is not as well organized or active as it should be, and CERAO has a very active commission. A national commission should be made up of diocesan or regional representatives and include one or several full-time men with the task of collating information supplied or gathered from the dioceses and making this available to the bishops with any interpretative analysis that will make it meaningful and practical. The commission should also promote education of the laity about Islam and assist in any eventual direct meetings with Muslims.

Rather than launching immediately something on the continental level, attention should be focused on the local, diocesan level, where relations with Muslims are usually the farthest thing from the minds of the bishops and clergy until a crisis arises.

Courses on Islam and relations with Muslims in the Nigerian seminaries (except for the East) are good, but attention should be given to the formation of future Nigerian Islamicists. For instance, in the Lagos Ecclesiastical Province no provision is being made for a Nigerian to take up from a somewhat older non- Nigerian (Kenny) at SS. Peter & Paul Seminary, Ibadan.

Perhaps a concrete breakthrough would come about by some Marian apparitions to Muslim children!