PPPLA: Chapter 11

* 12 *

Latin American Pentecostals:

Old Stereotypes and

New Challenges

HANNAH W. STEWART-GAMBINO AND
EVERETT WILSON

For many of us, old or new to the study of Latin American Pentecostalism, our frustration has been that old categories of analysis simply fail to illuminate. Even the most basic questions of the dimensions of the phenomenon-for example, how to measure the numbers of faithful and how to delineate numbers of churches-prove to be thorny problems for the researcher. For students of Latin American Catholicism, demographic or descriptive information is relatively easy to obtain. National surveys show that overwhelming majorities of Latin Americans traditionally identified themselves as Catholic. Actual participation in the rites of Catholicism (mass attendance, baptisms, marriages, and the like) can be estimated from church or civil records, surveys, or observation. But assertions regarding the size of the Pentecostal presence in any country must be viewed as more or less educated speculations. The lack of a single "church" with centralized parish, diocesan, or national records and the fluidity of church creation and revolving memberships make precise national measurements difficult.¹

In fact, much of the initial literature on Latin American Pentecostals focused on issues of size and growth rates. These are not arcane debates. A number of grand claims are made regarding the alleged explosion of Protestant, especially Pentecostal, membership. For example, the popular press, particularly the business press in both North and South America, trumpets that the Protestant Reformation has arrived in Latin America, promising at last to break the logjam of traditional cultural values inhibiting economic growth and capitalist development. Business leaders openly praise Pentecostal workers because they allegedly work harder and suffer from fewer vices. The Catholic church is redirecting sub-

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stantial resources toward traditional pastoral policies in part because of the widespread perception of a loss of Catholic souls to Pentecostal conversion. At the Latin American Bishops Conference held in Santo Domingo in 1992, Pope John Paul II warned against the "invasion of the sects" and "ravenous wolves," launching a continentwide "new evangelization" drive designed to strengthen the church's religious claim to Latin American culture. In sum, key institutions of Latin American life are making far-reaching decisions on the basis of a flurry of speculation regarding the Protestant and particularly the Pentecostal phenomenon. We seek in this volume to contribute to the understanding of Latin American Pentecostalism, and it is appropriate to ask ourselves now what we know and do not know.

The preceding chapters clarify a number of issues regarding the size, theological positions, historical roots, and interrelationships of Pentecostalism across a range of countries. We discuss below the most widely known and persistent, though inaccurate, stereotypes about Pentecostals in Latin America, describing the contributions to a more sophisticated understanding made by specific chapters in this volume, referring to other recent studies that discuss similar themes, and suggesting likely avenues for future research.

Old Stereotypes: New Challenges

Pentecostals as Newcomers to Latin America

One of the most persistent of stereotypes, particularly in the popular press, is that Pentecostalism is only a recent arrival to Latin America. Virtually every account of Pentecostalism employs the imagery of an "explosion" of recent growth. Each of the preceding chapters firmly puts this stereotype to rest. Although it is true that growth rates rose sharply in the post-World War II period, the roots of a number of national Pentecostal churches reach back to the early twentieth century-particularly in Brazil (1910), Chile (1910), Argentina (1910), Peru (1911), Nicaragua (1912), Mexico (1914), Guatemala (1916), and Puerto Rico (1916).²Some Latin American groups were in fact established prior to the formal organization of the North American denominations that are presumed to have brought them into existence.³ The vast majority of Latin American Pentecostals (upwards of 80 percent) are found in denominational groupings that have existed a halfcentury or longer. Some Latin American movements have sufficiently aged, in fact, that observers purport to find the indifference and loss of intensity typical of second- and third-generation religious revivals.⁴

The early birth of Latin American national Pentecostal traditions is significant for at least three reasons. First, although a few North American churches have been exported to Latin America, the founding experiences of Latin American and North American Pentecostalism were occurring more or less simultaneously in a number of countries. Latin American Pentecostalism, then, is not simply another

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foreign invasion or expression of religious imperialism; it must not be studied as a derivative of something else or dependent on outside explanation. Latin American Pentecostals developed their character with virtually no North American influence long before the prototypical Elmer Gantry was created or before there was a Billy Sunday to imitate. What models of Protestantism that were available were most likely Lutheran, Episcopal, and Methodist, middle-class reproductions of European or North American mainline denominations. Moreover, twentieth-century Pentecostals are not very similar organizationally to their putative North American founders, and in fact the largest movements have had the least North American influence. The Chilean Pentecostals, with a reported membership of 2 million adults and a community of as many as 14 percent of the population, retain a Methodist episcopal polity and practice infant baptism, while most of their U.S. Pentecostal cousins, especially those that later sent missionaries south, organized around a congregational polity and baptize only adults. The Brazilian Assambleias de Deus tend to polities, styles, and customs that bear little resemblance to any of the major U.S. Pentecostal denominations, least of all to the Assemblies of God (Springfield, Mo.). Yet the Assemblies of God has done little to correct the false impression, resulting from their similar names, that it brought the Brazilian movement-the world's largest-into existence. In fact, Brazilian and other Pentecostal leaders in the region believe that they, not the North Americans, are the standard-bearers of the movement, experiencing rapid growth and accounting for an estimated following from six to eight times the number of North American Pentecostals.

Denominational names are generally unreliable for determining the affiliation – let alone administrative control – of a North American church with its supposed Latin American counterpart. The Assambleias de Deus was named in 1918 by Brazilians under the influence of the Baptist-trained Swedish pastor Lewi Pethrus of the Stockholm Filadelfia Church when the North American group was just four years old and was still known in some quarters as the Church of God in Christ. Moreover, the name under which the Brazilians registered was in the singular; the plural only later came into use.⁵ Similarly, the large International Church of the Foursquare Gospel is known in Brazil as the Cruzada Interamericana de Brasil, offering no hint of its overseas denominational ties. In the case of Puerto Rico, the group of churches that affiliated with the North American Assemblies of God in 1916, the Iglesia de Dios Pentecostal, never used the name of its mainland counterpart even at its founding and, in fact, went its own way in 1953 without a backward look.⁶

What may be even more important is the strong influence Europeans have played in Latin American Pentecostalism. Brazilian Pentecostals trace their origins to two different sets of European "founding fathers."⁷ Gunnar Vingren and Daniel Berg, Swedish immigrants to the United States, took Pentecostalism to Belem, Para, in 1909 after having been introduced to the movement at the Chicago mission of William H. Durham the previous years Simultaneously, and

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without either's being aware of the other, Louis (also Luigi) Francescon, an Italian immigrant to the United States who had previously become a Presbyterian, introduced the movment to Italian communities in the south of Brazil.⁹ Moreover, the Argentine Asambleas de Dios (which traces its origins to 1910, four years before the founding of the North American Assemblies of God) is a Swedish group that was reported in 1982 to have a membership two and one-half times larger than the Argentine group identified with its presumed North American namesake. Similarly, one of the largest Pentecostal movements in Mexico was pioneered in 1919 by Axel and Ester Andersson, supported by the Swedish Filadelfia Pentecostal Churches. "The heritage of much of Latin American Pentecostalism is generally to be traced to Sweden and Norway," concludes David Bundy. "The heritage of Latin American Pentecostalism is as much European as from the U.S.A.."¹⁰

In addition, today, at the same time that North American churches send missionaries to Latin America, Latin American churches are sending missionaries both to other Latin American cities and to major U.S. cities. Anna Adams examines Puerto Rican missionary activity in Allentown, Pennsylvania. Allentown is not only a microcosm of the postindustrial Northeast but also typical of U.S. urban centers targeted by Latin American Pentecostal missionaries. Thus, the cultural heritage of Pentecostalism is far more complex than a simple imperialist model suggests. In David Martin's words, "People travel, especially in search of work; ideas travel with people. An effective `missionary' can be a domestic servant, a door-to-door salesman, or simply someone who goes to and from the urban center by bus "¹¹

Secondly, as the historical record amply demonstrates, Latin American Pentecostalism cannot be explained merely as some imperialist conspiracy masterminded in the United States. As cynically political as some North American attempts in the 1980s to export Pentecostal churches have been, the common thread running through the foundational experiences of Latin American Pentecostal groups is their specifically and exclusively religious character. Indeed, what distinguishes Pentecostal churches and followers from other churches and groups of faithful is the vivid and palpable religious experience that marks the specific moment of transition from the old life to the new.

Yet, the fact that North American and European Pentecostal churches have long contributed funds and personnel to corresponding Pentecostal organizations in Latin America continues to reinforce the mistaken perception that Latin American Pentecostalism is dependent on outside, specifically North American support. Two considerations are vital in this regard: Do national leaders and churches receive salaries or substantial operational budgets from overseas sources, and is property registered in the name of the denomination or mission (or a proxy)? The fact is that few if any funds are given to the national churches by overseas groups beyond occasional projects of a capital nature, such as church and educational buildings and, less often, land. Moreover, the resulting assets,

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usually in urban real estate, are typically held in the name of the national church. An occasional Latin American Pentecostal has complained that affluent North American Pentecostal groups should be more generous with their help; however, there is little basis for complaining about foreign dependency or control. ¹²In fact, as Bryan Froehle points out, it is likely that foreign involvement more adequately explains the continued viability of Catholicism in countries such as Venezuela than Pentecostal growth or vitality. For example, while no non-Spanish surnames are listed in the Venezuelan national directory of the Assemblies of God, the largest and most rapidly expanding Pentecostal denomination in the country, an astonishing 94 percent of the Catholic religious-order priests are foreign-bornhelping to explain why so many local Catholic church projects have been funded by religious orders and granting agencies in Europe and North America.

More to the point, however, even national movements that have developed a fraternal relationship with some foreign agency depend little upon it for resources and assistance. The major Pentecostal groups, the Iglesia de Dios del Evangelio Completo (Church of God [Cleveland, Tenn.]), the Cruzada Interamericana do Brasil (Foursquare Gospel), and the Asambleas de Dios (Assemblies of God) maintain only a few dozen foreign missionaries, though the combined constituencies of these Latin American churches run into the millions of members. Nor do these foreign personnel, a substantial proportion of whom are secondgeneration missionaries to whom the culture and language are not foreign, exert direct administrative control or assume the financial support of the churches, as they are engaged primarily in educational and other support services.

In addition, as the descriptions in our case studies show, the Latin American Pentecostals' customs, styles, and practices are autochthonous (nationally governed, sustained, and extended), owing little to foreign influence.¹³ The resources raised by these Pentecostals, their systems of polity, and their sense of ownership and control clearly indicate that stereotypes of foreign intervention in their operations are ill-founded. Ultimately, as our contributors all suggest, the region's Pentecostals possibly represent the most independent, self-initiated popular movement to be found in Latin America today.

Third, long-standing national Pentecostal churches' missionary efforts have paid off over time in the creation of a complex network of new groups. For reasons covered in the preceding chapters, Pentecostal churches tend to split often and easily, blurring the organizational lines between groups. The groups' development has been replete with defections by strong leaders and the proliferation of new Pentecostal organizations. Therefore, unlike the Catholic church or other mainline European Protestant churches, there is no one Pentecostal "church" with clearly defined organizational boundaries. Research opportunities will continue to abound in delineating local, regional, and national variants of the Latin American Pentecostal tradition.

At the same time, close observation also leads to the conclusion that the diversity of organizations is essentially a matter of the decentralization of similar if not

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identical groups that, should the constituents wish, could combine their efforts under one denominational administrative umbrella without damage to their beliefs and practices. As Guillermo Cook notes, the degree of doctrinal and organizational cooperation and agreement across broad lines within Pentecostalism belies the image of constant fragmentation leading to tensions between strong leaders and unbridled competition between churches. We are only beginning to understand the diversity and complexity of interrelationships of the Pentecostal landscape.

In the 1960s a penetrating study of Pentecostals celebrated their tendency to respond to local initiative, attributing their collective vitality in part to their diversity. Luther P. Gerlach found that these groups were characteristically "cellular, polycephalous and reticulate," semiautonomous and decentralized but interconnected segments. "Observers generally regard such a loose structure to be defective and seek to centralize it, tighten its command structure, terminate `unnecessary duplication' and otherwise `rationalize' its organization and operation," wrote Gerlach. "Our research leads us to propose that such organization is highly adapted for exponential growth."¹⁴ There is considerable reason to believe that Pentecostals readily cooperate on most issues and projects and freely move from one to another group when circumstances make such changes desirable.

Pentecostals as Apolitical

Another persistent stereotype is that Pentecostals are always and inherently apolitical. This image is both grounded in reality and wildly misleading. Typically, Pentecostals are portrayed as concerned only with matters of private morality, participation in church activities, and intragroup identity/solidarity. Some observers note that Pentecostals espouse a "render unto Caesar what is Caesar's" justification for eschewing political activity.¹⁵ But recent research including the preceding chapters indicates that there are numerous examples of Pentecostal participation in local and even national politics. Edward Cleary and Juan Sepulveda note that a set of Chilean Pentecostal groups previously organized around a pinochetista line in the hope of gaining privileges from the state. Bryan Froehle points out that the Venezuelan Organización Renovadora Autentica was one of the first explicitly evangelical political parties in the region, and although it does champion specific evangelical legislative interests, it also serves as an important minority member of legislative coalitions of support for larger, national interests. Philip Williams describes new evangelical-inspired political parties in El Salvador founded in an explicit rejection of traditional Salvadoran parties. In fact, new political parties that count on Pentecostal support now dot the region. If it is true that Pentecostals are apolitical, are these examples simply idiosyncratic?

First, let us look at what it means to be "apolitical." Pentecostals typically view their conversions in religious terms. Manuel Marzal's excellent research in urban Peru underscores this point. His respondents gave as their primary reasons for

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conversion "encounter with God and Christ," "experience of rebirth" (which brings redemptive changes in personal morality such as quitting drinking), experience of healing, and discovery of the Bible. Far less frequently cited were instrumental reasons for conversion such as the possibility of social mobility through the church, access to Pentecostal social networks (especially for newcomers to the cities), or support (moral or economic) from other members. All of these reasons are intensely personal with a focus on intragroup interaction; none of the reasons suggest that individuals convert because of Pentecostal groups' larger political agenda or vision for society.¹⁶ Pentecostals themselves do not view their conversions or church memberships as in any way relating to the world of politics.

A few Pentecostals are quite self-consciously antipolitical. For these, a focus on personal salvation and redemption is gained only through a rejection of the things of this world, which obviously includes movements based on necessarily false ideologies or belief systems. These groups, analogous historically to similar movements within mainline European religious traditions, draw rigid distinctions between spiritual and temporal matters and build strong intragroup identity through rejection of all worldly affiliations.

But Pentecostals often reject politics as a matter of compromises and deals struck between elites, those whose positions of power and wealth are viewed in Latin American society as inherently corrupt. Typically in many areas, elites are also seen as completely intertwined with the Catholic church. Many Pentecostals feel excluded from the interlocking networks of civil elites and Catholic officials whose relationships are continually reinforced by participation in activities not open to or rejected by Pentecostals. Moreover, historically the Catholic church has been (at times brutally) opposed to Protestants and Pentecostals, making Pentecostals reluctant to enter into organizations in public life considered to be enmeshed in Catholic social policy.¹⁷

At the center of Pentecostals' church membership is the shared experience of the Holy Spirit, not a shared vision for society at large. Thus, most Pentecostals view themselves as apolitical in the sense that their lives and social networks are committed to and built around their religious faith rather than other (particularly partisan) commitments. Moreover, there is a shared view that individual faith should be placed in God, not in social or political movements that promise temporal transformation on the basis of man-made ideology. In these senses, then, Pentecostalism is inherently apolitical.

As the preceding chapters show, however, Pentecostals' faith often leads to substantial local community and even national social service involvement, which can easily have political implications. "Pentecostals can be heard as often as anyone else decrying bad drinking water, dangerous buses and roads, unstable tenure of house plots, and the lack of electricity," reports John Burdick about crentes ina town just north of Rio de Janeiro.¹⁸ Typical programs created and funded by Pentecostals include rehabilitation programs for substance abusers, educational

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projects, and women's and children's assistance programs. Michael Dodson points to El Salvador's Liceo Cristiano, a twenty-five-year-old Pentecostal school system with thirty-four campuses and over 24,000 students, as a good example of the kind of commitment typically made by Pentecostal churches, although it is far more extensive than most. The Liceo Cristiano is affiliated with the international Programa Integral Educacional de las Asambleas de Dios (PIEDAD), which has affiliated schools throughout Latin America and provides schooling and many social services to 125,000 students. It is the largest private, non-Catholic network of educational facilities in the region. The vast majority of these schools can be found in the most economically distressed areas, and most of them offer meals, uniforms, and medical and dental assistance. ¹⁹

The foregoing chapters underscore the degree to which Pentecostals involve themselves in social service networks, both locally and nationally. Adams's chapter further demonstrates that this tendency travels with missionary activity in the United States. Pentecostals are not inherently passive social separatists divorced from the social issues and demands that surround them. In fact, resignation, whether personal resignation in the face of one's sins or addictions or hopelessness about the condition of others, is not a central attribute of Pentecostal believers. Carlos Rodrigues Brandao, a Brazilian sociologist, asserts that Pentecostals' "active belief in supernatural forces is not escapism, but a source of hope in their struggle to change their environment."²⁰

Perhaps it is not surprising that the degree to which Pentecostal churches are involved in social projects was initially overlooked. The traditional clientelistic linkages between Latin American states and the institutions of civil society, among which the Catholic church was always prominent, diverted scholars' attention from the kind of local, autonomous, and often fragmented activity typical of Pentecostalism. In turn, until recently the apparent lack of Pentecostal attempts to link their mobilization potential to traditional institutions of civil society (for example, political parties or other national movements) led observers to overlook the degree to which Pentecostals were enmeshed in organizational work of their own. In the words of the Catholic ecumenist Jeffrey Gros, "the Pentecostals do not have a social policy, they are a social policy."²¹

Pentecostals as Pawns of the North American Religious Right

A related stereotype of Latin American Pentecostals is that they are consistently linked to the North American religious right and likely to become tools of reactionary political regimes.²² Observers who view Pentecostals as antipolitical, rejecting any involvement in worldly politics, have argued that the effect of Pentecostal growth has been an implicit acceptance of the status quo.²³ The progressive Catholics most inclined to support liberationist Christian base communities, for example, tend to depict Pentecostals as religious escapists who shirk their social responsibilities and allow governments to continue to oppress their

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peoples without challenge. Christian Lalive d'Epinay's groundbreaking study of Pentecostals in 1969 coined the phrase "haven of the masses" to convey precisely this notion of religious retreat for those most dislocated by the sweeping forces of economic, political, social, and cultural change.²⁴ Others who focus on the tendency in Pentecostalism to espouse what are considered conservative social and behavioral norms (particularly with regard to gender roles) argue that Pentecostalism reinforces traditional, patriarchal, and essentially authoritarian Latin American beliefs. Hence, it is asserted that Pentecostals, while not necessarily involved in politically right-wing or reactionary movements, serve as new conduits for traditionally conservative and antidemocratic values.²⁵

Although it would be a mistake to view Pentecostalism as a political movement, several of the preceding chapters show us that some churches do enter the political fray in quite partisan ways. We are finding, however, that Pentecostals do not join partisan debates or electoral competitions rigidly or consistently. Not all Pentecostals are right-wing supporters of military or authoritarian rule, even though some Pentecostals have openly supported such regimes in countries such as Chile, Brazil, and Guatemala. Pentecostals have also supported reformist candidates or political "outsiders" in Peru, Brazil, and Venezuela. Rowan Ireland's discussion of the political implications of different kinds of conversion experiences in Brazil is especially suggestive here.

What seems to be consistent about Pentecostal partisan activity is not its ideological bent but its tendency to seek avenues for creating and making heard its own, unique "voice" in politics. Since most leaders are accustomed to working as part of a little-respected religious minority in the face of resistance from the political establishment, they tend to keep a low profile and choose skirmishes that they can win. In the meantime, Pentecostals are wary of confusing their perceived real interests and concerns with passing issues, and they sometimes avoid even participation in national evangelical organizations because of their concern for losing control. They are reluctant to deal away future advantage or to be used as conscripts in other people's wars – literally as well as figuratively. This posture was the basis of their opposition to the Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, where they adopted a not necessarily consistent position of pacifism, refusing to send their sons off to fight the Contras. Similarly, Cleary and Sepulveda suggest that Pentecostals' support for the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, like their support of his socialist predecessor Salvador Allende, can be explained in terms of their own logic as to what was best, given limited options, for their evangelical interests. This sense of independence, more than premillennial theology, anticommunist concerns, foreign influence, or any other motive attributed to them, may explain their particular political positions and policies.

At the same time, Pentecostals are highly skilled at mobilizing the marginal social sectors. As a result, increasingly other evangelical groups, which have often discounted these groups because of their humble constituents and lack of sophistication, are turning to Pentecostals for interdenominational leadership. For

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example, Pentecostals have been in the vanguard of negotiations with the Mexican government about the implementation of the recent constitutional changes, occupying positions that in former years would have been filled only by representatives of the historical denominations. Similarly, it may be expected that Pentecostal support will be courted by any number of other partisan national actors.

Pentecostal political activity is best explained, then, in terms of the nature of the political system in question and the obstacles to and opportunities for their participation. This shifts our attention away from inherent political beliefs toward questions such as the breadth and depth of a country's political party system, the degree of institutionalization of civil society, and the resources available to Pentecostals (wealth, historical tradition, political allies, strength of religious and political enemies or competitors, etc.) across national contexts. The key question is not which group of Pentecostals is "typical" or the "norm " The chapters in this volume show us that tensions over a range of theological and social-justice issues divide Pentecostals in a number of different ways. Rather, we need a framework for understanding the "space" that religions occupy in the different national political arenas.

To this end, we have discussed politics in terms of Pentecostals' own conceptions of their role in the communities or societies around them. But, beyond individual leaders' or churches' decisions, does widespread religious organization generally affect local or national politics? Typically, this question is posed by political scientists or policymakers interested in particular political outcomes such as democratization or stability.

For example, Michael Dodson argues that we must revisit the question first raised thirty years ago by Emilio Willems and Christian Lalive d'Epinay: Does widespread Pentecostal membership reinforce or undermine larger processes of modernization and democratization in Latin America? Dodson suggests that after three decades of dramatic economic and social dislocation, traditional aristocratic and paternalistic ties have been weakened in Latin America. At the moment, democracy appears to be more widespread, with deeper roots, than ever before in the region. Given the dramatic growth of Pentecostal membership precisely in those countries most ravaged by violence or economic crisis, Dodson argues that the question of whether Pentecostalism will serve to strengthen or weaken the associational ties of civil society that undergird democratic norms and processes is more salient today than ever before.

Dodson finds reason for cautious optimism. Along with Daniel Levine and David Martin, Dodson argues that the apparent surge in religious organization in parts of Latin America deepens democratic potential in the region. All three scholars suggest that Pentecostal growth rapidly expands new associational ties among believers that, over time, will challenge the traditional social order.²⁶ To the extent that the grass-roots organizing around participatory religious models strengthens civil society, thus improving the prospects for democracy, Dodson

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suggests that Tocqueville's characterization of Protestantism in the United States may now hold true for Latin America: "Freedom sees religion as the companion of its struggles and triumphs."

The contributors of the country chapters in the volume also find that Latin American popular groups, intent on bringing stability to their existence, have turned not just to religion but to organization. No other network of popular voluntary organizations outside the Roman Catholic church is as large and has so many resources. In the aggregate, Pentecostal churches have as many as 200,000 congregations, averaging per congregation probably no more than sixty in attendance but typically with legal recognition and ownership of real property. A closer look suggests that this process of institutional development-the creation of associations that they themselves own and direct-is one of the most important driving forces of these movements. Thus, Pentecostalism may also reinforce the cultural values, such as strong individualism, belief in at least the moral equality of all children of God, and access based on hard work and merit to avenues for social mobility, that are generally associated with Western liberal democracies.²⁷

In the end, what do we know about Pentecostals and politics? First, far more diversity exists across groups than we originally imagined. At the very least, many Pentecostal churches are heavily involved in local community work in the delivery of vital social services that, in turn, links them with questions of public policy. Second, research shows that Pentecostals do enter partisan politics, both locally and nationally, in different ways. It may be that this should be expected. The decision to attempt to influence the larger, political debates of society can be supported biblically as well as by the call of the Holy Spirit. As Pentecostals grow in number and organizational strength, it is likely that their attention will turn beyond the immediate goal of missionizing and intragroup identity. Furthermore, there is no political agenda inherent in Pentecostal belief or official church policy, and this means that Pentecostals have a range of political options consistent with their faith. In fact, recent debate within evangelical circles centers precisely on the issue of "contextualization of the Gospel message," sometimes meaning the translation of one's faith into social responsibility. A number of writers have pointed out the vast transformative potential of grass-roots Pentecostal growth; however, it is reasonable to expect a range of diversity among Pentecostals themselves regarding the nature of the desired social changes.

It will be helpful to add one cautionary note at this point. As academic observers of Pentecostalism, we tend to look for the behaviors that our disciplines define as important – the political ramifications, sociological effects, or psychological motivations. However, we should learn from our mistakes in the 1960s-1980s, when we overestimated the (particularly political) influence of liberation theology by tending to ignore the fundamentally religious motivation of the vast majority of Catholics.²⁸ Moreover, it no longer makes sense to focus entirely on church-state relations except in the few cases where larger Pentecostal

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churches have entered national politics or established Pentecostal groups have organized umbrella organizations to achieve specific ends, such as in Chile. Certainly, established churches over time often develop linkages with the dominant culture and the political arena. But without new approaches we run the risk of overemphasizing such phenomena simply because they are more accessible to the researcher.

Pentecostals as Antifeminist

Common to most Pentecostal churches is a relatively traditional view of gender relations. As Anna Adams points out among Puerto Rican Pentecostals in Allentown, Pennsylvania, Pentecostals themselves often distinguish between "conservatives" and "progressives" on the basis of churches' positions on the proper role of women, both in their homes and in their churches. For the most part, men generally are conceived as heads of household, women as keepers of the home and hearth. More conservative churches may also segregate church services by gender, impose traditional dress codes on women, and explicitly prohibit women from holding positions of authority within the church. Not surprisingly, critics of Pentecostalism have argued that the spread of Pentecostal membership in Latin America reinforces traditional machismo, further locks women into subordinate roles that ensure their continued oppression at home and in national "development," and places God on the side of those who condemn empowerment for women.

Carol Drogus's chapter demonstrates that scholars are taking a new look at the implications of Pentecostal gender relations. Building on the work of Elizabeth Brusco and others,²⁹ Drogus suggests that although Pentecostals' traditional gender divisions are intended to reinforce male dominance, the combination of emphasis on religious equality, new roles open to women in the life of the church, and the equalization of work traditionally relegated to "women's sphere" all serve to undermine hegemonic ideologies of machismo and marianismo.

Cecilia Mariz and Maria das Dores Campos Machado's chapter on women in Brazil underscores the notion that Pentecostalism can dismantle traditional machismo; yet the authors argue that Pentecostal women choose to adhere closely to traditional moral and social codes. The difference for Pentecostal women is not that they reject traditional values regarding family, sexual codes, or gender roles; rather, they see themselves as individuals responsible for their own liberation from the oppression of evil, defined as natural passions and instincts. It is the process of individuation, coupled with the assertion of a primary responsibility to God rather than one's spouse or family, that transforms women into active, responsible agents in their own and their families' lives. These researchers assert, then, that Pentecostal conversion not only "domesticates" male roles but also results in greater individuation and autonomy (if still traditional in social values) for women.

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Further questions remain, however, concerning the implications of Pentecostalism for Latin American women. As editors, we asked each contributor of a country chapter to examine the role of women in the churches they investigated. Not surprisingly, this proved difficult for most contributors; solid research is rare. As Drogus points out, even though the majority of active Pentecostal participants are women and women are often seen as having peculiar access to the ecstatic Pentecostal experience, little systematic research has been conducted on the role of women in Pentecostalism and its effects on them.

Some clues may be provided from the literature from other regions. For example, Elaine Lawless's work on women preachers in U.S. Pentecostal churches finds that even in traditions that explicitly bar women from positions of church authority, a number of women have become respected preachers and (albeit more rarely) church pastors. It suggests that women can transcend traditional gendered roles within Pentecostal communities by invoking God's insistent call (and their humble attempts to refuse) to serve Him as an instrument for His voice. Lawless's analysis of the preaching styles of female versus male preachers shows that women claim authority for their messages precisely by emphasizing that they are merely God's instruments, reluctantly obeying His command to serve – that is, displaying the very submissiveness and obedience traditionally assigned to women.

Scattered examples of women in leadership positions in Pentecostal churches do exist throughout Latin America. Historical studies of the institutionalization of North American religious groups give us reason to be cautious in our optimism, however. In the experience of other churches, growth and institutional "success" often led to a rigidification of traditional gender roles, resulting in the eventual prohibition of female pastoral leadership even in churches originally led by women. For example, Jean Soderland writes of early-nineteenth-century Methodism in the United States: "While female membership had grown considerably, the number of women leaders did not. Women lost the opportunities to preach and lead congregations when worship services moved from the fields and homes into churches that were built in the traditional Christian design with the pulpit situated at the front."³⁰ It cannot be clear yet to what degree Pentecostal churches will adapt to dominant social norms as they settle into established positions of authority with diffuse and multiclass roots.

The historical record of other religious institutions reminds us to focus on the "gendering" of Pentecostal churches over time. Borrowing from Joan Acker, "in this approach gender is a process, not a characteristic of persons, although, of course, the assignment of persons to gender categories is a central aspect of the process.... [This means that] gender is present in the processes, practices, images and ideologies, and distributions of power" in the institutions of social (or religious) life. ³¹This focus shifts the central questions away from a snapshot description of women's roles toward the ways in which women are included in or excluded from positions of authority, the undermining effects of the Pentecostal

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religious experience on traditional male/female conceptions, and the extent to which religious institutions and the character of particular religious groups have been formed by and through gender.

Further research must explore more carefully the kinds of roles played by women, the religious justification for female participation in the gendered spheres of the church, the effects (if any) of female religious leadership on other women in Pentecostal groups, and the potential for empowerment in traditional "women's work" within churches.³² Another issue that has been largely ignored is the role of single women in Pentecostal churches. Beyond suggesting that young women attend Pentecostal services in the hope of finding more egalitarian, serious, and faithful prospects for husbands, virtually all of the research on women focus on wives and mothers. What is the conception of women within Pentecostal circles beyond the categories of wife and mother?

Pentecostals as the Poorest of the Poor

The mission field for most Pentecostals is among the poor. According to existing studies, the areas of greatest growth among Pentecostals are urban shantytowns and, to a lesser extent, rural peasant communities. This has led to a general image of Pentecostals as poor, dispossessed, and marginalized. Statistically it is true that Pentecostalism has spread more rapidly in the lower classes, but the stereotype encourages faulty logic and poor methodology. Instead of asking what explains Pentecostal growth, observers often ask why poor people convert, and this question produces certain kinds of "answers." A representative list of reasons given for Pentecostal conversion includes the following:

1. The poor and uneducated do not understand the contemporary, particularly progressive, Catholic message.

2. Christian base communities "require too much," especially in countries where community commitment can be life-threatening, from the already socially and economically vulnerable faithful.

3. The poor and marginalized convert to Pentecostalism for instrumental reasons-for example, access to Pentecostal mutual aid or other social service programs.

4. Poor people are drawn to Pentecostalism, particularly in countries experiencing dire economic or political dislocation or violence, because the emphasis on taking responsibility for one's own life lends a sense of control to people otherwise subject to the vagaries of forces beyond their control.

5. Because authority and leadership in Pentecostal churches do not require years of study, celibacy, or approval through an international chain of command, aspiring young men are drawn to Pentecostal churches as possible paths to career and social mobility.

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6. Pentecostal churches, led by strong, authoritative pastors who control access to the social service benefits of membership, reproduce the paternalistic patron-client relationships of traditional Latin American society and therefore provide needed psychological security to dislocated populations.

A few of these common explanations for Pentecostal growth have some merit, but there is significant evidence that Pentecostalism is not exclusively a lowerclass phenomenon. In countries such as Guatemala, Brazil, and Venezuela, a substantial Pentecostal incursion into the middle to upper-middle classes is evident. Not surprisingly, explanations for middle-class conversion focus less on the ignorance or instrumentalism of converts than on the role of religions in the societies of different countries.³³ For example, Everett Wilson's chapter argues that the emergence of Pentecostal groups in Guatemala represents a new, national infrastructure of churches that, while made up largely of poor individuals, own their own buildings, have legal recognition, and are organized well beyond their local communities. Pentecostalism, then, fills a void both in religious terms and in terms of providing new organizational opportunities in Guatemalan civil society. As Wilson points out, this understanding of Pentecostalism in Guatemala shifts research attention away from arguments regarding the size of different groups or the importance of such highly visible figures as ex-president Jose Efrain Rios Montt toward the more difficult issues of examining the strength and potential of popular religious groups and the space they occupy in local and national life. Such a research focus might offer new insights regarding why people of any socioeconomic group might convert to Pentecostalism.

Pentecostalism as Atheological

Pentecostalism's growing reach into the middle classes has another important ramification. One of the supposed attractions of Pentecostalism, especially for the poor and uneducated, is greater access to the authority of the Holy Spirit. Pentecostal churches are organized around the experience of the Holy Spirit, which is open to anyone. Many observers have concluded that because Pentecostal pastors usually lack seminary training and authority is conferred by the Holy Spirit rather than by scholarly bodies that define theological orthodoxy, Pentecostals lack firm theological foundations. But the image of Pentecostal services as simply "emotional happenings" is inaccurate. Some descriptions, such as Ireland's of Brazilian Pentecostals, emphasize just how routine and unexciting a Pentecostal church service can be, since permitting congregational participation in a public meeting is possible only because of considerable structure, stylization, and, ultimately, control.³⁴ However enthusiastic the Pentecostals' worship may be at peak intervals, spontaneity is kept within acceptable bounds.

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One may point to the structure of the groups themselves to establish that they represent a fairly high proportion of dedicated, convinced members. The sociologist Bryan Roberts found in investigations of these groups in Guatemala that Pentecostals formed "effective moral communities" with a demanding code of conduct.³⁵ Pentecostals form close-knit congregations that require a postulant to demonstrate extraordinary commitment. New members must regularize their marital status, abandon what are considered personal vices, attend meetings regularly, support the group's programs, respect the group's purposes, and contribute regular financial support. The criticism that the Pentecostals are too "legalistic" about personal conduct is much more frequent than that they are too lax.

Although behavior does not speak to belief, the piety required of members of popular Pentecostal groups is tied to study, reflection, and values. Despite their vulnerability to tangential teachings, in practice these groups hew close to doctrinal lines. They are avid biblicists who tend to quote scriptures correctly and with meaning. They seem to know more about the differences between Mormons, Baptists, and Seventh-Day Adventists than their typical North American counterparts. The rote learning characteristic of Latin American elementary education and the thirst of the common people for information combine to make Bible studies sometimes interesting but almost always predictable.

Latin American evangelicals of any kind deeply resent the term "sect," understanding despite reassurances about the technical meaning of the term that its use makes their movements less than completely Christian. They aspire to emulate the primitive church of the New Testament Acts of the Apostles, empowered by the same spiritual impulses. Donald Dayton argues that we should understand Latin American Pentecostals as a renovating force within Christianity in an early stage of evolution. Like other now-mainline churches such as Methodism, "the new churches are born among the poor, and as they advance into the middle classes, they begin to assume the characteristics of a middle class church while continuing to be a force for renewal within the more traditional churches.."³⁶ Dayton points out that North American degree-granting, accredited Pentecostal seminaries are only a decade or two old. As Latin American Pentecostalism becomes a more multiclass phenomenon, we might expect a similar trend in the codifying of a critical theology and systematic ethics. That prominent Latin American Pentecostal leaders have already achieved appointments to theological faculties is a sign of precisely this trend.

Moreover, most Protestant groups have in some measure become "Pentecostalized" by adopting such practices as prayer for the sick and belief in personal empowerment and miracles, let alone clapping and rousing coritos (repetitious and, critics claim, often theologically shallow choruses) in their meetings. "Since we all believe the same way about the work of the Spirit," says a Baptist lay leader in Central America, "why don't we non-Pentecostals simply acknowledge that the deep differences that separated us in the past no longer exist?" The vital-

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ity of the Catholic charismatic movement demonstrates that even the Catholic church can borrow elements of Pentecostal worship.

Conclusion

Few of the images usually conjured up to visualize Latin American religion accurately portray the Pentecostals. If traditional bell towers, ornate altars, votive candles, and street processions have little to do with the current Pentecostal religious enthusiasm, neither do the stereotypes of "Holy Roller" frenzy, nostalgic "old time religion," and slick televangelism. The problem is that Latin American popular Pentecostalism, not without a rightful place in the spectrum of Protestant evangelical categories, is very much something of its own. But stereotypes, especially those that have to do with religious subcultures, die hard. The literature has been limited by the inadequacy of the available imagery and the lack of reliable definitions and statistics. This volume moves our discussion past easy stereotypes and fills in a number of the gaps in our knowledge with careful and systematic scholarship, but much remains to be accomplished.

NOTES

1. Harvey Cox, a long-time observer of Latin American churches, expresses similar frustrations in Fire from Heaven: The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the Reshaping of Religion in the Twenty-first Century (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1995), pp. 161-184.

2. These conventional dates are given in David B. Barrett, ed., World Christian Encyclopedia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

3. The Assemblies of God (Springfield, Mo.) was founded in 1914; the United Pentecostal Church was created by mergers of groups first organized in 1917; the Pentecostal Church of God was organized in 1919; the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel was created in 1923. Most of the remaining North American Pentecostal denominations, such as the Church of God (Cleveland, Tenn.) (1907), have earlier organizational dates because they existed as Holiness churches prior to their adopting Pentecostalism. See Robert Mapes Anderson, Vision of the Disinherited: The Making of American Pentecostalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Stanley Burgess and Gary B. McGee, eds., Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Regency Reference Library, 1988).

4. John Kessler deals with the issue of evangelical attrition in "When Latin Americans Evangelize," Christianity Today, April 5, 1993, p. 73. Kessler's work is cited and discussed in Edward Cleary, "Protestants and Catholics: Rivals or Siblings?" in Daniel R. Miller, ed. Coming of Age: Protestantism in Contemporary Latin America (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994): pp. 223, 224.

5. In its official history the Assambleias de Deus (Brazil) claims to be the first organization to adopt this name, now found in more than one hundred countries. After initially calling itself the Missao de FéApostolica, the group registered its present name with the Brazilian government on January 11, 1918. Abraao de Almeida, Historia das Assambleias de