CONFLICT AND COMPETITION: The Latin American Church in a Changing Environment
edited by Edward L. Cleary / Hannah Stewart-GambinoCHAPTER 4 =================================
Popular Movements and the Limits of Political Mobilization
at the Grassroots in Brazil
=========================== CAROL ANN DROGUSIn the Brazilian autumn of 1981, expectations surrounding the return to electoral politics were building. The Party Reform Law of 1979 had legalized a range of political parties, and Brazilians eagerly anticipated direct elections in November 1982. In this heightened political atmosphere, the Catholic comunidades eclesiais de base (CEBs) held their fourth National Encounter at Itaici, São Paulo.(1) Journalists speculated about the role Catholics organized in the CEBs would play in the new electoral system. Most predicted a party endorsement-probably of the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) -- from Italici.(2)
The creation of a unified leftist voting bloc was widely seen as a natural outcome of the CEBs' activities. Because of their association with liberation theology and religious and political conscientização (conscientization), CEBs were perceived "as seedbeds of a new, democratic culture and social order, providing norms that legitimate equality and the promotion of social justice."(3) Their democratic practices posed a potential challenge to traditional Brazilian electoral populism.(4) Moreover, thousands of working-class CEB members took to the streets of São Paulo and other cities in movements that challenged the state and speeded the democratic opening, providing plausible evidence of emerging new political attitudes.
In the end, however, no political endorsement ensued. Subsequent events showed the electoral weight of the CEBs and the progressive church more generally to be slight. They have had limited success in cultivating class-based party identification.(5) Overall the record is clear: Despite success In mobilizing popular political movements, the CEBs will not influence national politics through the ballot box.
Although their political limitations are now obvious, the groups have achieved important, sometimes overlooked, successes as well. They have roused many individuals on the margins of Brazilian political life to activism, Including protest on behalf of the needs of their families and communities. Specifically, they have brought many women -- poor, rural-born, and uneducated -- into the political arena. It is true that partisan affiliation remains weak and the numbers reached through the communities are, in any case, too few to translate into electoral clout. The importance of the personal transformation experienced by CEB members in general, and women in particular, however, is profound.(6)
Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the CEBs' political accomplishments requires analysis at two levels. First, we must examine the constraints that limit the political influence of the progressive wing ofthe church as a whole.(7) Of particular interest here is the progressives' limited ability to reach a wide public.
Second, a full explanation requires that we also understand patterns of response to conscientização by CEB members. Low interest in partisan politics has been documented, but too often it is merely described or attributed to a "failure" of conscientization. Members' preferences for some modes of political activism rather than others must be explained. This is best done by working outward from the religious ideas of the participants to their political behavior.(8) Thus, after I briefly discuss some limits on the church's larger role, I focus in this chapter on individual responses, attitudes, and behavior. In particular, I discuss the oftenneglected majority of urban CEB members: women.(9) The responses of this group are important not only to the success of the CEBs' political project but also to the continued vitality of the communities and the church itself.
Limits on the Progressive Church's Political Role:
The Institutional and Social LevelThat the progressive church's political potential was exaggerated in the waning years of the military government is now clear. Many factors, however, contributed to overestimating the numerical strength and political cohesiveness of the CEBs. Several of these are illustrated by the archdiocese of São Paulo, where my research was carried out and which, under the leadership of Dom Paulo Evaristo Cardinal Arns from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, was considered one of the most progressive in Latin America. In fact, São Paulo's importance and Cardinal Arns's prominence probably contributed to misperceptions of the strength of the progressive movement within the Brazilian church as a whole.(10)
The archdiocese strongly encouraged the formation of CEBs, a pastoral priority from 1976 to 1980.(11) One source of the very high political expectations was the CEBs' activism and visibility. São Paulo's CEBs generated numerous social movements. As the abertura (opening) permitted more activism, poor people -- especially from the CEBs -- took to the streets to voice a growing variety of demands. Although the fact was little noted at the time, women, and especially those from the CEBs' clubes de maes (mothers' clubs), spearheaded these movements.(12) The Church provided crucial material and logistical support for many movements, unifying the atomistic peripheral neighborhoods and motivating participation in the first place. In São Paulo, high participation rates in popular movements were correlated with the fact that invitations to join were issued by the local church.(13)
The São Paulo church's visible role in the two-party elections before 1982 also enhanced the image of CEB political strength. Cardinal Arns's public moral stand for social justice and the political abertura helped shape the political debate and lent legitimacy to the opposition. The church's endorsement may have helped candidates more than political endorsement as autênticos, or historical members of the opposition. For example, Dom Paulo's endorsement and CEB votes were probably crucial to Fernando Henrique Cardoso's victory in 1978, especially in working-class areas with many CEBs, including the one in which this research was conducted.(14) In the two-party context, then, church mobilization affected opposition voting.
The accomplishments were real, but expectations for the progressive church as an electoral force faltered for several reasons. Most obvious were the strictures that multiparty democracy and the growing concern of the Vatican placed on the hierarchy (see Chapter 3). In contrast to their willingness to back a united opposition to the authoritarian regime, the bishops were reluctant to risk a party endorsement that would alienate some Catholics, and the Vatican discouraged this as well.(15)
The CEBs themselves might have remained more active than the hierarchy after 1982 because as lay groups they could claim a right to make a party option. In fact, as the journalists at Itaici predicted, many individual CEBs directly or indirectly endorsed the PT.(16) But the presence and impact of the progressive church in the urban periphery had been tremendously overestimated. The most fundamental impediment to the church's political role was the fact that its ability to reach significant segments of the population with conscientização and a clear liberationist message was always limited for a variety of reasons. The number of core participants in each CEB A smak The groups have not been successful in recruiting nonpracticing Catholics. There is considerable variability in CEB members' participation and in different CEBs' commitment to progressive practices. Finally, disagreements among progressives on Political issues are a further obstacle restricting the Church's influence.
We know that São Paulo's 756 CEBs are nearly all located in the urban periphery.(17) There are no membership records, however, that may have contributed to the equation of the popular church with popular religiosity. Nothing could be farther from the truth.(18) Brazilians are a religious people, but most practice a folk Catholicism that is essentially private and unconnected to the institutional church. Moreover, the CEBs were formed by already practicing Catholics, not from among folk Catholics as many thought.(19) The CEBs I studied, for example, were formed largely by women with lifelong ties to the church who had been recruited via the CEBs' parent parish. (20)
In any case, numbers in the CEBs were never large. Each community has about fifteen core activists who run both religious and political affairs. A similar number regularly assist when called upon. As many as one hundred people may attend mass if a priest is officiating. Even if we estimate one hundred members per CEB, however, the CEBs' weight in São Paulo's electorate would be limited. (21)
But such an estimate itself overlooks the heterogeneity of experience in the CEBs. Occasional participants, especially, are unlikely to engage in regular Bible study or political conscientization groups. Only about 65 percent of working-class CEB members participate in religious reflection, which might expose them to the ideas of the progressive church. A mere 35 percent engage in specifically political consciousness-raising.(22)
Moreover, the CEBs themselves are quite diverse.(23) The character of a CEB depends greatly upon its clerical and lay leadership. Although São Paulo's clergy overwhelmingly agree that part of their mission is the formation of Catholic political consciousness, they are not all equally accepting of liberation theology or certain political ideas.(24) Thus, although all CEBs fulfill basic religious functions, they vary in the degree and form of their political involvement. The hegemony of progressives within the local and national church concealed a range of political and religious opinion among clergy implementing the "option for the poor."(25)
Overall, then, the progressive church's presence among the poor is weaker than the ferment of CEB-backed popular movements suggested. This alone restricts their potential political weight, but another institutional factor also necessarily limited the transformation of political movement activism into electoral organization. The progressive bloc itself is divided over the issue of the relationship between the CEBs and political parties. Many priests are skeptical of political parties and fear that they will manipulate the CEBs.(26) A few take an anarchist position; most believe that popular social movements are more valuable than political parties.(27)
Three basic models of CEB-party relations exist: neo-Christendom, in which CEBs are the basis of a party of the church; complementarity, in which CEBs eschew political functions in favor of a purely religious role; and dialectic, in which the CEBs discuss the political dimensions of faith but the party develops the concrete program that expresses religious and ethical beliefs.(28) The debate over the CEB-party proper relationship has raged since the late 1970s. At the 1989 National Encounter of CEBs, opinion ranged from the view that the CEBs were no longer playing a political role, to Clodovis Boff's call for a "party-political pastoral" enabling Christians to "create a party that is popular, transforming and democratic."(29) The practice in individual CEBs is thus bound to vary widely. Many-including those in my research area-identified with the PT and come closer to the third model, a tendency Bruneau and Hewitt in Chapter 3 suggest continued to the 1989 elections. In others, the desire to avoid partisanism and favor a more ethical approach to politics led groups to limit their involvement in politics. Membership in a CEB thus does not guarantee exposure to partisan political debate.
The party debate suggests an important point: the difficulty of transforming an ethical critique of society into a practical political strategy. It is clearly a fundamental obstacle to the CEBs' exercising a major role in electoral politics. Given the dilemmas theologians and other church leaders experience in connecting the ethical and religious teachings of liberation theology to a practical political strategy, it is not surprising that CEB members find this a perplexing task at best; many choose not to address it at all.
Despite their clear political limitations, however, the CEBs did manage to turn out thousands of working-class men and, especially, women in a variety of social movements. Their political impact was real, although limited, and may have involved important transformations for those individuals who were reached with a message of liberation and conscientização. What did this activity mean? How much did it reflect changing religious and political values? To raise these questions is to inquire into individuals' experience within the CEBs.
Responses to Conscientization in the CEBs:
The Individual LevelA profile of the average CEB member in São Paulo is virtually a portrait of political marginality. The vast majority are poor, were born in rural areas, work in low-skilljobs, and have little education.(30) At least two-thirds of all and perhaps as many as 90 percent of the most active members are women.(31) Poor, rural-born, religious, uneducated women -- according to most studies of political behavior, this is a recipe for political conservatism, if not apathy and alienation.(32)
Before their involvement in the CEBs, the women in the Itaim Paulista region of São Paulo conformed to that stereotype. They unanimously affirmed that they had never participated in any social movement or organization. Most had no interest in politics and simply voted the way their husbands told them to. Like most poor Brazilian housewives, they were on the margin of politics.
For many the CEB was a revelatory experience, giving them practical skills and opening up a realm of unimagined possibilities for participation in the public arena.(33) As one woman said:
Being in the struggle, with the participation we have, is a beautiful thing. Even if we haven't had a chance to study, like me, myself, I don't know much. A person without schooling doesn't know much, not even how to get around, eh? And that was a very important thing. While we were that way, I, like I said, was a housewife. And look, nowadays we go to every blessed place trying, looking for things. (34)The CEBs' importance in providing these opportunities for poor women cannot be overemphasized.
Individual women's political participation, however, replicates the pattern of political mobilization at the municipal level. They confronted bureaucratic hostility, police, and fire hoses in a variety of social movements, but their activism was largely confined to those movements. The ability of conscientization to raise specifically class-based consciousness appears to have been slight. They were more likely than their non-CEB female neighbors to support the PT, but that support was soft. Even women with a more politicized commitment restrict party activism to voting and minor campaign activities.
Why do women who have taken the difficult, dangerous step of confronting the state in authoritarian Brazil often fail to move into the easy activities of voting and campaigning for a party that is seen as the natural ally of their social movements? To answer this question is to inquire into the women's motivations and their own perceptions of their activism. Two themes emerge as important. First, we must understand the way in which the women's religious pracices and beliefs sustain and shape their politicaI involvement. They have not been passive recipients of the ideas of the progressive church. Understanding their interaction with these ideas-what they accept, reject, and reinterpret -- will help us to understand the form and future of their political activism.(35) Second, we must ask to what extent and in what ways the gender identity of the overwhelmingly female CEB members plays a role in their political activism. For women in the CEBs, this question is linked to their religious self-image as well, through their understanding of the traditional Catholic model of womanhood described by marianismo, the cult of Mary, the mother of Jesus.
Religious Orientation and Conscientization
The parish of Santo Antônio provides favorable conditions for conscientização along classic liberationist lines. At least until late 1986, the progressive line was dominant in the parish.(36) The pastoral agents laid the groundwork for the CEBs by inviting catechists, about fifty women, to weekly Bible groups. These moved from liberationist-inspired reflection on the Bible to a discussion of the area's concrete problems.
The catechists in Santo Antônio took up the challenge to find a "new way to be Church," in Leonardo Boff's phrase. Six groups of catechists went on to form CEBs, which spread until by 1986 there were nearly thirty.(37) But the results have not been precisely those that a knowledge of liberation theology and the ideas of the progressive church would lead us to predict. Even in a propitious environment like Santo Antônio, the path to conscientização is neither easy nor direct.
The new religious practices and liberation theology were jarring for the parishoners in Santo Antônio. Some simply rejected the CEBs, convinced that the new priests were either communists or evangelicals.(38) For those who continued, the transition was difficult. As one woman commented: "We received a big shock. We were going to church just to pray, and now we go to church to participate, and to help. To participate!"(39) Nearly all of the women who became extremely active in the CEBs expressed a lifelong attachment to the church, which probably both motivated and facilitated their assimilation into the CEBs.(40) But even among those who remained active, not all responded to conscientization in the same way.
Three Broad Religious Orientations
There is growing evidence that individual religious experience varies greatly, even within a single denomination.(41) Thus, we might expect to find different patterns of adaptation to the progressive church among base community members. Because CEBs are integral parts of the institutional church in Brazil, not sects, we can anticipate nearly as great a range of personal religious orientations within the CEBs as within the practicing Catholic population as a whole.
In Santo Antônio's CEBs, three general tendencies in religious orientation can be discerned. Using the terminology of Peter Benson and Dorothy Williams, we can describe the women roughly as people-concemed, self-concerned, or integrated religionists.(42) Each orientation is reflected in a different response to the ideas of liberation theology and the challenge of conscientização.
People-concerned religionists. People-concerned religionists emphasize the importance of community, connectedness, and responsibility to others. But they extend this sense of connectedness beyond face-to-face relations. Iracema described her participation this way: "[It is] not just for our own children-we are doing this for all of our children, for all the poor children of Brazil.(43) People-concerned religionists are unusual in the degree to which religion motivates them to seek fairness, justice, and well-being for all-even people outside their family and immediate community.
More than any other group, people-concerned women also perceive religion as a challenge: It motivates them to act on their faith in the world. These women expressed the challenge dimension of their faith in describing their response to the CEBs. Some felt they were signing on for an "apprenticeship."(44) Others described the call to participate as a physical force: Iracema felt "a weight fall on [her] shoulders" when the priest said people needed to participate more. She promptly went out and joined the CEB's women's group.(45)
The value orientation of people-concerned religionists is characterized by an emphasis on social justice. Although we cannot establish the extent to which the interviewees held those values before becoming involved in the CEBs, this group more than the others embraces the theology of liberation. Asked about the meaning of symbols such as the kingdom of God and Christ as liberator, they replied in classic liberationist terms. They were quite clear that God wills the material liberation of the poor and the oppressed. Although often unsure about the exact form it would take, they believed that some kind of socialism would move Brazil closer to God's plan. They thought it would do so because it would end injustice, create equality, and give people their rights, including the right to participate.
Zélia's comments provide a succinct example of this religious type. While her seven sons were growing up, she was waiting for an opportunity to get out and do something in the world. "Captivated," she said, by the idea of the CEBs, she fought and argued with her husband and even went on the sly to participate.
Zélia spontaneously offered an interpretation of Christ's message. Describing conditions against which some workers were striking at the time of the interview, she said:
I perceive very clearly that when we go and look at Christ, that isn't what he wanted. Christ, he died, he came to fight against all that. And now we have to ask ourselves what we will do. I think we have to fight, too. That's my thinking. That alienated religion that just sits there, that isn't being the church of Jesus Christ.(46)Later she offered this description of the kingdom of God, the objective toward which the CEBs are struggling: "To really have equality, that would be a type of socialism.... We who study the Bible, we see that the kind of society Christ wanted was that kind. [Was] socialist.(47)
Such internalization of the message of liberation theology is what pastoral agents hope to achieve through conscientização. In fact, however, it sets the people-concerned religionists apart within the CEB. Other religious types coexist with the people-concerned religionists in the CEBs, but reject their understanding of liberation theology.
Self-concerned or traditional religionists. The second group is distinguished by a strong emphasis on morality. These respondents expressed concern over the breakdown of the family, loose morals among youth, and crime.(48) They are absorbed with their personal relationship with God, with individual salvation. For them, finding God is a personal experience, not something that occurs through relationships with others. But this is not so marked for the women as the ideal type of self-concerned religiosity would have it. For these women, individualism is mitigated by their traditional value-emphasis on the role of women as caregivers. Given this tendency to muted individualism, these women might be described more aptly as "traditional religionists."
This group views religion as a source of comfort in a harsh worlt in contrast to the people-concerned religionists' perception of religion as challenge. Margarita says:
You go to church with a thirst, a thirst for God.... Ali, it seems you've forgotten all the problems you left behind! . . . Then, a person who left the house desperate, slapped, pushed, her kids in the brush where she took them so her husband wouldn't kill them, she arrives in church and you begin to speak of God, she begins to see him. Here, I've found a peace, a relief....(49)Traditional women also place much more value on the institution of the church, with its sacraments and so on, than the others.
Unlike people-concerned religionists, traditional women have accepted few of the new ideas put forward by the progressive church. They have, however, fused their traditional beliefs with the new language of liberation theology. As afesult, they often sound like people-concerned women in group meetings and church services. But deeper questioning reveals that the key concepts of liberation theology have very traditional meaning for them.
Traditional women believe strongly in the separation of faith and politics. Unlike the first group, they expressed the view that poverty is natural and inescapable.(50) As a result, they rejected the concept of Christ as a liberator of the materially poor and oppressed. Margarita distinguished political liberation from "liberation with Christ": "Let's not mix politics with the church. . . . 'Ah, Jesus worked that way, it's in the Bible . . .' No! That's not written there, church and politics, no. 'Ah, but Jesus died for . . .' No! Jesus died for the salvation of sinners!"(51) She added that conversion in Jesus's name" means "liberation of faith, of morals."
Traditional women share the people-concerned religionists' belief that it is incumbent upon us to "struggle" in this world. Given their rejection of liberationist Christology, however, they did not conclude that struggle includes fighting for a change to a socialist -- or indeed any other -- political order. Rather, they perceived the fight in religious and individual terms. One common theme is the idea that Christians must struggle for a conversion of hearts: their own above all but also those of other people. In another vein, the women often describe as God's will their personal struggles to improve the lot of their families, especially their children. Margarita, Or example, equates the need to "struggle" with her sacrifice, working in menial employment so that her children could finish school.(52)
The traditional women realize that their views are at odds with the values often preached in the CEBs. They can reconcile themselves with the CEBs, however, in part because those groups still represent the Catholic church. Many are able to separate the actions and words of lay CEB members Born the institution of the church/CEB itself. Cristina, for example, claimed that laypeople using liberationist concepts were "confused" and misunderstood what the church stands for.
Moreover, the CEBs offer many opportunities Or direct participation in church life. Whatever their disagreements with lay leaders (and even pastoral workers), many traditional women are thrilled by the chance to participate in liturgy groups and as lay ministers. Thus, they are able to separate out and reinterpret the liberationist concepts they do not share and the CEB, which continues to represent the church they love.(53)
Integrated religionists. In many respects, integrated religionists fall between the two extremes of people -- concerned and traditional women: "Integrated religionists present a portrait that shows them balancing between the extremes ... able much of the time to be 'both-and' rather than 'either-or.'"(54) Thus, for example, the integrated religionists share the traditional women's concern with individual salvation, but also have a much higher emphasis on community, love, and charity that places them close to the people-concerned religionists' orientation. What sets them apart from the social justice orientation of the first group, however, is the greater degree to which they stress face-to-face acts of charity, rather than seeking justice for individuals in the abstract as the first group does.
Integrated religionists presented mixed interpretations of religious symbols. They are likely to agree that Christ desires the liberation of the materially poor and oppressed. They have more sympathy for poverty and those affected by it than the traditional women, who often describe the poor (other than themselves) as "lazy." Traditional women view crime as a result of moral degeneracy. Integrated religionists take a "love" position: Criminals are often driven to their acts by great necessity and should be helped rather than condemned. As Maria Angela says, "badness is born from misery," and God will not punish the thief."(55) Chica blames social neglect of children for criminality: "It's very sad, isn't it? That shouldn't happen. Because God put us all in the world, all pure. But society is what spoiled all that.(56)
Unlike the people-concemed women with whom they share this interpretation and who endorse socialism, integrated religionists do not perceive a clear connection between the socioeconomic and political situation and its results in terms of poverty and crime. They see the Kingdom above all in terms of small, individual, face-to-face acts of love and kindness:
We go to help our brother in his needs, his problems.... And if we act that way, we are going more into the kingdom of God here on earth.... I should listen to you, because you have problems and I do, and listening is what is lacking. That for many is missing among us, the Kingdom. For us to listen to people, also to give when necessary, that also is part of the kingdom of God.(57)Whereas most of these respondents began their descriptions of the Kingdom by discussing face-to-face charity and concrete examples of love, they do not reject the connection of religion and politics as the traditional women do. Though less essential Or them than for the people-concerned religionists, politics is still, viewed as a legitimate religious concern by this group. They simply do not endorse the position that a change in socioeconomic system alone is the single or even primary way to move society closer to the Kingdom.
Marcela began by saying that conversion of one's own heart is the first step toward the Kingdom-a very traditional-sounding view. But she added that the next step is to conscientize people and organize them to demand their rights.(58) For the most part, integrated religionists speak of reforms that would ease the lives of the poor, especially poor children. Or they wish to gain greater equality of treatment before the law and government officials.(59) Through a combination of personal change by the poor and the rich and of political reform, they believe that capitalism can be transformed into a humane, salvageable socioeconomic system.
In sum, there are three broad patterns of response to the liberationist ideas of the CEBs. Similarities as well as differences emerged from the interviews, however. The women vary in their religious attitudes, but all share the view that women have a special role to play in society -- a role the unique character of which comes from their experience as mothers.(60)
GenderAttitudes and Conscientization
Simone, a people-concerned religionist, eloquently expresses the belief in women's "special" role:
At the bottom, the very bottom, it's for the children that we do everything. There are people who see all this [misery] and don't really see, don't understand. But we understand, we see with the hearts of mothers. That's why women are in every fight. Not for ourselves, but for all the people.(61)This is an echo of Iracema's view that women were fighting for the well-being of all the children of Brazil.
People-concerned religionists are not alone in this perspective, however. Margarita, a traditional religionist, described her belief that women have a special gift of love that they should use to help others.(62) Integrated religionists also described the love and compassion they feel for the abandoned street children and their wish to do something to help them.(63)
Concern for children and families may result from women's concrete tasks in the gender-based division of labor in urban Brazil: Women must occupy themselves with the health, education, and care of their children, for whom they are primarily responsible. But the most active women in the CEBs have no children at home. Their activities are not a product of personal interest. They stem from deeply held beliefs about the role of women. These my be traceable in part to the powerful cultural influence of marianismo.
Some differences emerged in the women's interpretations of the Virgin Mary. Traditional women, for example, strongly emphasized Mary's moral example of virginity. In contrast, a people-concerned woman recalled a book that "took off some of those clothes" and uncovered Mary as a woman like herself.(64) Another said Mary pushed Christ to begin his ministry with the miracle at Cana and thus was a "participant" in his ministry.(65) These interpretations may reflect the CEBs' attempt to reconceptualize Mary as an active, courageous participant in history, like the women themselves.(66)
All of the women, however, held Mary's traditional image in high esteem. Traditional and people-concerned religionists alike stressed her model of motherhood, love, and compassion. They shared the notion that Christian women have particular responsibilities toward others in the community, especially children. Indeed, the CEBs' appeal to women to become politically active is sometimes couched in terms of their responsibilities as wives and mothers, modifying but reinforcing, rather than challenging, traditional gender roles and stereotypes.(67) Most of the time, however, the women said the CEBs had not encouraged reflection on Mary as it had on religious symbols. Thus, traditional interpretations were left unchanged and unchallenged for many. They provide a common language and set of issues that bind the women together.
Because past research has shown that religious orientation is correlated with political attitudes and behavior, we can expect to see divergent patterns of political activism among CEB members.(68) Integrated and people-concerned women are likely to be more liberal or radical in their political views and perhaps more activist as well. Traditional women should be more conservative. We can also expect areas of shared concern, however, especially regarding children. As Iracema pointed out, even the most conservative women want the CEB to support activities that help children, though most women vote against activities like discussion groups on "faith and politics."(69) It is from this mixture of divergence and shared concerns that the pattern of women's political activism has evolved.
Religious Orientation, Gender, and Political Activism The CEBs in Santo Antônio have promoted two types of political mobilization. They initiated or supported a variety of social movements: for daycare, sanitation, water, street paving, street lights, land title. At the same time, the local church has encouraged electoral participation generally and especially on behalf of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). As already mentioned, CEBs in this part of São Paulo have come closer to the neo-Christendom model of CEB-party relations.
Participation in Social Movements
How have the women responded to the two types of mobilization promoted by the CEB? Looking first at social movements, we see that nearly all of the women have participated in at least some of the social movements in some way. Many have participated in several. But there are differences in the degree and form of women's participation according to their religious orientation.
People-concerned religionists emerge as the leaders of both the CEBs and the social movements. Iracema, Zélia, and women like them organize the movements and recruit others to join them. These women moved from one issue to another as each movement's goals were achieved. Most of the CEBs in Santo Antônio began with a sanitation movement, and once the garbage dumps were cleaned up, the women leading the mothers' clubs quickly found other neighborhood concerns around which to organize.
Integrated religionists present a more mixed profile of participation. Some, especially those with young children, expressed support for the movements, but claimed that they simply could not be away from home enough to participate fully.(70) A few, like Marli and Chica, have worked hand in hand with the people-concerned religionists as organizers, though they are not generally the recognized leaders. For the most part, however, integrated religionists are the faithful rank and file of the movements. They "make up the number" when people are needed to protest at a government office, to do the door-to-door canvassing, and so on. Like the first group, many move from issue to issue, participating in a wide range of movements.
Traditional women followed a similar pattern. Again, younger mothers rarely or never participated in social movements.(71) Most traditional women, however, participated in at least one of the movements. A few, like Neide, were active in nearly all.(72)
Several characteristics of this group's participation are distinctive, however. First, some traditional women consider charitable work as a form of participation, but had little interest in or knowledge of more political activities. One older woman described her activities visiting the sick as part of the community's "health pastoral," although the CEB has also promoted a movement to demand a health post as part of its pastoral activties.(73)
Second, they select movements in which to participate and are more critical of them. Cristina participated in a sanitation movement, but does not participate in the daycare movement. Her reasons for refusing reflect her traditional value emphasis:
I don't agree much with the ideas of this daycare movement. Just for this reason, that daycare takes children out of the home .... They won't have that idea of family.... Daycare, movements like that, I think the church is being too unilateral in these, you know? (74)Similarly, Margarita participates in the land movement, but in keeping with her traditional values, she does not support the movement's use of illegal invasion as a tactic. Although she acknowledged the movement's claim that God gave the land to all in common, she said that the "laws of man" that divided it up must be respected.(75)
Traditional women may also confine their participation to certain activities. Only Neide mentioned participating in demonstrations, for example. Margarita could not recall participating in any protests. She attends meetings, and she provides follow-up and support work, however. She and Neide are both on the advisory board of the health post. They represent the CEB at meetings, make lists of needed equipment and medicine, and inform the mothers' club of the problems.
Although religious orientation seems correlated with differences in participation, nearly all of the women have found at least one movement they were willing to support actively. The women's descriptions of their own activism suggest a reason for the acceptance of social movements even by those rejecting liberation theology's political analysis. Most construed the movements in terms of common gender values.
We have already seen expressions of maternal concern by peopleconcerned activists. Integrated religionists also often expressed a personal desire to help children, and their movements for daycare centers and an after-school care program are expressions of this compassion. Similarly, both Simone, a people-concerned religionist, and Fatima, an integrated religionist, described their efforts to form a sewing cooperative in the same terms. They do not need the work or income, but they hope the cooperative will help young girls from a nearby favela (shantytown) to learn a marketable skill and avoid prostitution or other sad fates.(76)
Traditional women also spontaneously linked the movements with a concern for the children. Neide's participation in the sanitation movement was motivated primarily by the health hazards that the open garbage dumps posed "to poor people and to children.(77) Cristina explained her participation in the sanitation movement as follows:
I like a movement that brings something good to the people. It was with Darcy, Father Darcy that got married, that we started that movement, and we even got rid of the garbage. I mean, that was a productive thing, it was good. In addition, it was a shame to see the children that lived there.(78)Margarita's greatest efforts at the health center focused on trying to guarantee distribution of free milk for infants.(79)
Despite the radical character imputed to the social movements by many observers in the early 1980s, understanding the motivations of CEB members who participated in these movements puts them in a rather different light. Even women who reject the political options made by pastoral agents and social justice activists in the CEBs felt at home in the social movements. The less-conscientized women saw the movements as a way to "care" for children and community in a larger arena. Traditional women were also able to perceive participation as an extension of charitable activities in a new direction. They recognized that they were acting politically, but in effect, political implications were for them merely incidental. The government needed to be challenged to do something good for people. This was much more a moral than a political position.
Church sponsorship reinforced the moral validity of the movements. For Cristina, the sanitation movement is inextricably linked with the presence of Father Darcy, who encouraged the parish to organize it. Neide was afraid to participate at first, but said the fact that "the priests were together with us" in the movements made it easier.(80) In another community, a lay activist complained that the women would "follow behind Sister Gabriela, crying, into every movement." As a layperson and one who understood the women's conflicts and difficulties, she could not make them feel "guilty" enough to leave their domestic duties and participate. (81)
None of the women, including the traditional women, regarded the movements as wholly nonpolitical. But the "helping" aspects of the movements, their construction as an extension of women's traditional religious and familial roles, and their locus in the church made it easier for women with no particular political or ideological convictions to view the movements as a positive contribution to the community. In essence, they became a moral or charitable act rather than a statement of political belief.
Electoral Participation
As noted earlier, translating moral beliefs into effective political action is much more difficult than making them the basis of a social movement or a generalized critique of the regime. This difficulty is reflected in the degree to which consensus among the women in the social movements breaks down when electoral issues are at stake. In this second mode of participation, the people-concerned religionists are exceptional in both party identification and degree of political involvement.
Pastoral agents in the parish and the diocese claim that the PT in Itairn Paulista is a direct result of conscientização in the CEBs.(82) Among the regular CEB participants-women in the mothers' club, the liturgy groups, conselhos (councils), and so on-there is a general, expressed consensus in favor of the PT. CEB activists often use ostensibly religious services and meetings to do a little propagandizing for the party as well.
The agreement at the meetings, however, hides a wide degree of variation in political attitudes. Traditional women, especially, may feet compelled to voice the same "line" as We others at meetings. Neide said she did not support any particular party, but she mistrusts the PT leadership and is strongly anti-Communist. Shortly after privately explaining in detail her objections to communism and socialism, however, she joined in a gmup discussion of the upcoming election by making a very typical pro-PT speech.(83)
Other traditional women express some regard for the PT, but say that they consider each candidate individually. On those grounds, they are willing to vote for a range of political positions. Cleide, for example, said she rather liked the PT's candidate for governor, but thought she might vote for a wealthy center-right businessman. That individual was roundly criticized by many pastoral agents and CEB activists in the parish as the patrão, the "boss."
In contrast, all of the people-concerned and most integrated religionists interviewed supported the PT.(84) These two groups, however, generally do not share the same level of political analysis or political activism. Integrated religionists offer only the vaguest reasons for supporting the PT. They may say that it is a "small party," "a weak party," or that it is "on the side of the poor." They are unclear as to its objectives, but think of supporting it as a way in which the poor support the poor. After all, many PT candidates are workers, and thus the women believe they will have a more natural understanding of the problems of the poor. Integrated religionists (and some traditional women as well) often seem to favor the PT primarily because those around them, especially the CEB leaders, do. Maria Angela says, "We see that it is the party of the church."(85) As with the social movements, the impression given is one of a vaguely moral support, rather than support for a specific political position. Such support is clearly susceptible to erosion, especially as the Vatican increases pressure on the Brazilian church to lower its political profile.
Most integrated religionists limit themselves to voting for the PT. Their reluctance to become involved in politics again reflects the essentially moral nature of their political involvement. Chica, an active participant in the social movements and a declared PT supporter, nonetheless limits her electoral activities:
I go to vote and all, you know? We have meetings with the women and I talk, no? But I don't really like politics.... And I have to say, A makes me nervous. I don't know how to talk about politics, because I don't like it .... People come and talk about those things, I get nervous. And people disagree, I get mad, and I don't like that. I go to some meetings because it's necessary, but I don't like it!(86)A distaste for political conflict and an approach to issues that springs from an ethic of love may combine to allow integrated religionists to view the PT as an appropriate political vehicle but to limit their politicization and partisan activism. Only one woman from this group has joined the peopleconcerned women in higher levels of involvement, like working the polls or distributing campaign literature in the neighborhood.
People-concerned women are unique in their degree of political understanding and involvement. They alone express relatively clear reasons for supporting the PT that go beyond moralism or its identification with the church. This group sees a socialist future as the only real hope for solving Brazil's serious social problems and recognizes the PT as a party committed to building socialism "from the bottom up." They are the most active partisans, devoting considerable time to electoral support work and organizing political meetings and rallies.
But the price of such activism for many of the people-converned activists has been dean Some am single, which facilitates their participation.(87) Others have limited their political participation because of family problems.Iracema explains her dilemma:
With party politics, I still haven't liberated myself. I participate whenever I can. I'm a party member, but I don't have, you know, real "work ...... But every time I say something, my husband gets scared, you know? I think if I enter in party politics, everything will be over! So I go very slowly. It's much more difficult than just participating in the church.(88)A few have either separated from their husbands or live with them in a hostile truce.
Given their shared belief in the importance of women's role in the family, all of the women view such situations with dismay. Many of the traditional women, especially, privately criticize the people-concerned activists for neglecting their families.(89) Integrated religionists are sometimes more admiring of the activism, but are unwilling to make the sacrifices in their own families that they see being required of the people-concerned women.(90)
Successes and Failures of Political Mobilization
Through the CEBs, the church has brought thousands of women into the political process. It has made all three types of religionists more aware of and informed about politics -- a not inconsiderable accomplishment when we consider the universality of the women's claim to have ignored politics before joining the CEB. Under any circumstances, their numbers would be too small for electoral effect. As the base of a social movement, however, they are strong. And they would still be available for mobilization if such a movement were presented in their frame of reference.
The CEBs have radicalized or conscientized only a few, however: the people-concerned religionists and, less uniformly and to a lesser extent, some of the integrated religionists. The social movements, especially, unite women with a fairly wide range of political positions because of their ethical cast. Women who see the movements as a crucial building block in achieving social justice, those who see them as an expression of love for the less fortunate, and those who see them as an extension of their traditional mothers'role have joined in a common cause. The fact that the social justice activists, the movement leaders, share the model and vocabulary of women's special role has surely facilitated incorporation of women with divergent political views. For the rest, a mobilization based on moral concerns is important but limited. For one thing, it is likely to mean that their active political participation will flare only when a particularly pressing local issue arises.
Ongoing mobilization for sustained electoral participation has been far less successful. Distant, of uncertain benefit to the community, divisive, and often corrupt, partisan politics do not appeal to the moral values of integrated or traditional religionists. Moreover, such politics often appear distressingly unfeminine to women who value a conciliatory female role. The people-concerned religionists alone have developed a sense of the political implications of their moral beliefs that is informed by liberation theology. They are unique in believing that the moral projects of the social movements are incomplete without a restructuring of Brazilian society.
The moral nature of most CEB members' participation means that their movements, and even many of their votes, cannot be interpreted in terms of political categories like "radical" or "conservative." Women who yesterday picketed the military government might well be willing to picket a PT government tomorrow if the same kinds of issues are at stake. Thus, the impact and meaning of the CEBs' moral politics will continue to derive from the context in which they are played out.(91)
CEBs and the Church in the 1990s A variety of social and institutional factors will continue to limit the church's political role generally in the future. Even the role of CEBs specifically will be diminished by the difficulties of mobilizing their constituents for directed electoral activity. Weaknesses in the progressive church's ability politically to mobilize Brazilian society are compounded by the individual factors that influence the process of conscientização among those who are mobilized in the CEBs.
Having explored the political implications of religion in Brazilian CEBs, we can reverse the image and ask what challenges the CEBs, their militants, and especially their female leaders pose for the institutional church. One of the key areas in which the CEBs may complicate church strategy is in the competition with Protestant sects. Feeling the threat of evangelical encroachment among We urban poor and under pressure from the Vatican as well, many sectors of the Brazilian church propose a respiritualization and depoliticization of the CEBs, a strategic change Bruneau and Hewitt describe in Chapter 3.
It remains to be seen, however, whether such change would enable the CEBs to compete with Protestant groups for unaffiliated folk Catholics, a group which to date has been marginal in CEB formation in the cities. Evidence from Colombia suggests that poor urban women may be the basis of Protestant expansion, just as they are the core of the CEBs. Yet Protestant women converts are apparently seeking a different kind of moral structure and have a different construction of gender identity than many women in the CEBs. They seem to look to religion as a means of "taming" men and making them economically reliable, thus allowing women to fulfill their roles in the domestic sphere. Women in the CEBs, in contrast, have been encouraged to expand their wife-and-mother roles into the public sphere, even though their public action is often meant to shore up their ability to fulfill their domestic responsibilities toward children.(92)
A resacralization of the CEBs and a renewed emphasis on domestic issues and family morality might prove an effective way to attract unaf filiated folk Catholics, potential Protestant converts whom the CEBs have not reached. They would also be attractive to traditional religionists and at least some integrated religionists, two groups whose allegiance to the church is already fairly secure. These changes, however, would pose a different problem for the church. They would alienate the social justice activists who are the backbone of the CEBs, both religiously and politically.
People-concerned women, unlike most activist men, remain closely linked to their base communities and are often the organizer of catechism, liturgy groups, and religious ministries as well as political movements. They are an important part of the church's work force, and many threaten to withhold their labor if the church returns to strictly religious practice and discourages activism, or at least women's activism. Alienated by the more conservative turn of the diocese recently, people-concerned leaders in Santo Antônio decided to give up commitments at the regional and diocesan level.(93)
The church must accommodate women activists in another way as well. Many are becoming increasingly aware of the problems they face as women. The church encouraged their activism, but did not help them reconcile their domestic, religious, and political obligations.(94) Nor did it help them to understand sexism or to deal with the objections of husbands and children. Despite a growing literature by Latin American feminist liberation theologians, including Brazilians Ivone Gebara and María Clara Bingemer, there has been extremely little reflection on gender in the CEBs.(95) Activist women, however, concretely experienced the conflicts, stress, and fatigue that their new roles in both church and society evoked. Moreover, they began to wonder why they could have a voice in politics but not within the church they so devotedly served.
Women from Itaim Paulista have, as a result, begun to organize themselves as women to discuss their special problems. Their intent has never been to challenge the hierarchy, but the church's response to their organization has been cold.(96) The women's group was denied use of church facilities. Women were particularly hurt by their exclusion from organizing committees for the church's 1990 Lenten activities, the theme of which was "Women and Men: Image of God."(97)
Having awakened many laypeople to social activism through the CEBs in the 1970s and 1980s, the church has created its own dilemma for the 1990s. Strategies aimed at bringing folk Catholics into the sacramental fold and lowering the church's political profile are likely to alienate the very lay leaders the church created. Unless it can accommodate them and respect their independence and desire for a voice in the church as well as in society, the Brazilian church risks the loss of many of its hardestworking lay activists, particularly the women of the CEBs.
1. I use the terms CEBs, comunidades de base, and base communities interchangeably.
2. Ralph Della Cava, "The'People's Church, 'the Vatican, and Abertura," in Alfred Stepan, ed., Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 156-157.
3. Daniel Levine, "Religion, the Poor, and Politics in Latin America Today," in Daniel Levine, ed., Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), p. 14.
4. Teresa P. R. Caldeira, "Electoral Struggles in a Neighborhood on the Periphery of São Paulo," Politics and Society, 15, 1 (1986-1987), p. 44.
5. Thomas Bruneau, "Brazil: The Catholic Church and Basic Christian Communities," in Levine, Religion and Political Conflict, p. 120.
6. This point is eloquently made in Daniel Levine and Scott Mainwaring, "Religion and Popular Protest in Latin America: Contrasting Experiences," in Susan Eckstein, ed., Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 207.
7. Much excellent analysis has been devoted to the institutional level of analysis. See especially Scott Mainwaring, The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1986); Della Cava, "The 'People's Church'" and Thomas C. Bruneau and W. E. Hewitt, "Patterns of Church Influence in Brazil's Political Transition," Comparative Politics 22, 1 (October 1989), pp. 39-61.
8. Levine, "Religion, the Poor, and Politics," pp. 3,16-17.
9. The analysis is based on a case study of CEBs in Itaim Paulista, a region of São Paulo's Zona Leste. São Paulo and the Zona Leste are in many respects atypical, because they are considered among the most politically sophisticated and religiously "progressive" regions in the country. It would not be possible to generalize from the São Paulo experience to all of Brazil. At the same time, however, given the region's advantages, any limits that we find there could be taken as the most fundamental forces shaping conscientização and the CEBs' political role.
10. Della Cava, "The 'People's Church,"' p. 148. See also Bruneau and Hewitt in Chapter 3.
11. Della Cava, "The 'People's Church,'" p. 149.
12. These included the Movimento de Custo de Vida (MCV), born in São Paulo's mothers' clubs in 1973. The MCV mobilized thousands of women to demonstrate for wage increases and price freezes.They eventually gathered more than a million signatures in support of these points, and the MCV spread nationwide. See Marianne Schmink, "Women in Brazilian Abertura Politics," Signs 7, 1 (1981), pp. 122-123. The church also turned out thousands of women in a movement for daycare centers in São Paulo's poor neighborhoods. Secular and middleclass feminist groups later joined the struggle, but the CEBs took the initiative. M. Gohn, A força da periferia: A luta das mulheres por creches em São Paulo (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1985), pp. 105-106.
13. E. J. Vasconcellos and Paulo J. Krischke, "Igreja, motivações e organizações dos moradores em loteamentos clandestinos," in P. Krischke, org., Terra de habitação x terra de espoliação (São Paulo: Cortez, 1984), p. 59. Mainwaring argues similarly for Rio de Janeiro; see Mainwaring, The Catholic Church, 204.
14. A. F. Pierucci, "Democracia, igreja e voto: O envolvimento dos padres de paróqia de São Paulo nas eleições de 1982," Universidade de São Paulo, Ph.D. thesis, 1984, pp. 123-124.
15. Della Cava, "The 'People's Church,'" p. 156.
17. W E. Hewitt, "The Structure and Orientation of Comunidades Eclesiais de Base (CEBs) in the Archdiocese of São Paulo," McMaster University, Ph.D. thesis, 1985, pp. 100-102.
18. Della Cava, "The 'People's Church,'" p. 155.
19. Bruneau, "Brazil: The Catholic Church and Basic Christian Communities," p. 119.
20. The pattern of CEB recruitment is discussed in Carol A. Drogus, "Religion, Gender, and Political Culture: Attitudes and Participation in Brazilian Basic Christian Communities," University of Wisconsin-Madison, Ph.D. thesis, 1991, ch. 5.
21. In 1984 the municipality of Sao Paulo's electorate numbered 4,542,546, Empresa Metropolitana de Planejamento de Grande São Paulo (EMPLASA), Sumário de dados de grande São Paulo 1983 (São Paulo: EMPLASA, 1984), p. 45.
22. Hewitt, The Structure and Orientation, p. 131.
23. Levine, "Religion, the Poor, and Politics," p. 14.
24. Pierucci, Democracia, igreja e voto, p. 288. Eighty-eight percent of Pierucci's respondents agreed that "the mission of the Church is to form the political consciousness of the people" (p. 287).This agreement conceals, however, a considerable disagreement about how such consciousness should be formed. For example, priests of different age groups varied considerably in their responses to questions designed to measure degree of political radicalism (p. 522).
25. Della Cava, "The 'People's Church,'" p. 143.
26. Pierucci, Democracia, igreja, e voto, pp. 369-370; Mainwaring, The Catholic Church, p. 202.
27. Pierucci, Democracia, igreja, e voto, p. 532.
28. Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, "Comunidades: cristãs e política partidária, Encontros com a Civilização Brasileira 3 (Sept. 1978), pp. 15-17.
29. As reported in Latin America Weekly Report, September 14, 1989.
30. Hewitt, The Structure and Orientation, p. 120.
31. The lower figure is from Hewitt's survey of people attending mass in lower-class CEBs; Hewitt, The Structure and Orientation, p. 120. The higher figure is from a survey in my research area of people participating more intensively in the CEBs as members of grupos de rua, small prayer and reflection groups; "Aos animadores dos grupos de rua," São Paulo, mimeo, 1986, pp. 127-128.
32. Examples of tests of the hypothesized connection among religion, gender, and conservatism include Derek Urwin, "Germany: Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics," in Richard Rose, ed., Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1974), pp. 156-157; and Keith Hill, "Belgium: Political Change in a Segmented Society," in Rose, Electoral Behavior, pp. 92-93. Gary Marx found among blacks in the United States that women were more religious and, at the same time, less politically militant than men. Gary Marx, "Religion: Opiate or Inspiration of Civil Rights Militancy Among Negroes?" in B. Beit-Hallahmi, ed., Research in Religious Behavior: Selected Readings (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1973), p. 385.
33. The educative function of the CEBs is stressed by Carmen Macedo, Tempo de genesis: O povo das comunidades debase (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986), p. 237.
34. Interview (C) 02-01.07.86.
35. Daniel Levine, "Popular Groups, Popular Culture and Popular Religion," Notre Dame University, Kellogg Institute Working Paper No. 127, 1989, p. 3.
36. This was true up to 1986. Since then the diocese has been separated from the archdiocese of São Paulo Bishop Angélico Sândalo Bernardino was replaced in 1989, and many pastoral agents have been replaced with people widely considered more conservative and less committed to CEBs. There are indications that the diocese and parish are attempting to assert more control over the CEBs.
37. Interviews 45-04.04.86; 01-RM 04.01.84.
38. Interviews 20-29.10.86 and 26.07.86.
40. The exceptions are themselves telling. One woman became disenchanted with the church when her father, in the wake of the changes wrought by Vatican 11, forbade her to become a nun (interview 27-19.11.86). Another grew up in a nominally Catholic family but rarely attended church. Her passionate involvement in the CEBs began with her personal decision to make a belated first communion at thirteen (interview 23-20.10.86).
41. Michael R. Welch and David C. Leege, "Religious Predictors of Catholic Parishoners' Sociopolitical Attitudes: Devotional Style, Closeness to God, Imagery, and Agentic/Communal Religious Identity," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 27,4 (1988), p. 546; Peter L. Benson and Dorothy L. Williams, Religion on Capitol Hilk Myths and Realities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 137.
42. See Benson and Williams, Religion on Capitol Hill.
48. Interviews 15-23.10.86,13-21.11.86, and 34-25.09.86.
53. An interesting discussion of some factors that have led US Catholic feminists to reconcile themselves to the church despite their criticisms of its sexist practices is contained in Andrew Greeley and Mary G. Durkin, Angry Catholic Women (Chicago: Thomas More Press, 1984). 1 believe that a similar process is at work among traditional women in the CEBs.
54. Benson and Williams, Religion on Capitol Hill, p. 129.
60. In the interview, the one clear exception to this pattern was a single, childless woman in her thirties who is a people-concerned religionist. Her activism is oriented primarily toward workers' issues rather than the more usual social movements. She has worked in a variety of factory and nonfactory situations and considers herself a trade-unionist.
62. Interview 15-23.10.86. 63. Interviews 11-11.11.86 and 22-01.12.86.
63. Interviews 11-11.11.86 and 22-01.12.86.
66. Solange Padilha, "Características e limites das organizações de base femininas," in C. Bruschini and F. Rosemberg, orgs., Trabalhadoras do Brasil (São Paulo: Brasiliense/Fundação Carlos Chagas, 1982), pp. 199-200.
67. Ibid.; Ana Dias and Maria José Rosaldo Nunes, "A mulher, a igreja e processos da libertação," Série de Cadernos para Subsídios aos Movimentos Populares, mimeo, 1984, p. 31.
68. Welch and Leege, "Religious Predictors," p. 546; Benson and Williams, Religion on Capitol Hill, p. 148.
71. Interviews 09-07.08.86; 08-22.06.86.
73. Interview (C) 05-20.08.86.
76. Interviews 18 and 39-03.12.86.
82. Interviews 42-22.08.86 and 46-19.09.86.
83. Interview and field notes 34-25.09.86.
84. One woman expressed her intention to split her votes between the PT and the historical opposition party, the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasiliero (PMDB) (interview 25-18.11.86).
91. Levine, "Popular Groups, Popular Culture, and Popular Religion," p. 12.
92. This interpretation is based on David Stoll's discussion of Elizabeth Brusco's research in Colombia, as described in David Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 318-319.
94. Sonia Alvarez believes that this neglect occurs because discussion of the women's problems might quickly run up against questions of church doctrine. Sonia Alvarez, "The Politics of Gender in Latin America: Comparative Perspectives on Women in the Brazilian Transition to Democracy," Yale University, Ph.D. thesis, 1986, p. 273.
95. Dias and Nunes reached the same conclusion based on observations of CEBs in other areas of São Paulo. Dias and Nunes, A mulher, p. 27.
96. This lack of support may be part of the general tendency toward providing less support for CEBs and their activities that Bruneau and Hewitt describe in Chapter 3.
97. Interviews 01-29.05.90 and 59-29.05.90.
INDEX