CONFLICT AND COMPETITION: The Latin American Church in a Changing Environment
edited by Edward L. Cleary / Hannah Stewart-GambinoCHAPTER 2 =================================
Redefining the Changes and Politics in Chile
=========================== HANNAH STEWART-GAMBINOBecause of its history of progressive leadership, both in Chile and Latin America, the Chilean Catholic church has been the object of intense scrutiny in recent years. Ivan Vallier, the first North American social scientist to see the church's potential contribution to Latin American modernization, pointed out the relatively early emergence in the 1930s and 1940s of a progressive faction of Chilean priests and bishops committed to expanding the church's ties to the working class.(1) The steady radicalization of the progressive wing of the church in the 1960s and early 1970s, evidenced by the splintering of the church between reformist and radical factions, has been examined at length by such authors as Brian Smith, Thomas Sanders, and others.(2) Further, the crucial role of the Catholic church in preserving a space for democratic opposition to the Pinochet regime and in providing individuals protection from the human rights violations of the military government has been the focus of much scholarly as well as journalistic analysis.(3)
Virtually all of the literature on the Chilean Catholic church suggests that the hierarchy's progressivism, especially the majority's courageous role under the Pinochet regime, strengthened the Chilean church's national influence, broadened its scope of authority, and allowed the church to develop a truly national, multiclass, and ideologically inclusive community of faithful. Indeed, not only did the Chilean church serve as a symbol of Opposition to the military regime, but it also lent its substantial institutional resources to the struggle for democracy, resulting in the creation of a broad array of ecclesial and quasi-ecclesial organizations from the grassroots to the national level. But with the election of President Patricio Aylwin and the return to democratic rule and party politics, the challenges facing the church changed significantly. What role will the church play in democratic Chile in the 1990s? Can the church maintain the same level of national (particularly political) influence and the same scope of authority? What will the emergence of a cacophony of "new voices" mean for the institution that so successfully served as "the voice of the voiceless" for the past decade and a half?
This chapter is divided into four sections. Because some call for the church to return to its historical position "above politics," the first section briefly reviews the unique features of the pre-1973 relationship between the church and Chilean politics and society. The second section describes the role adopted by the church during the dictatorship, and the third focuses on the way in which the church contributed to the transition to democracy. The final section analyzes the present and future role of the Catholic church in the context of the challenges facing Chilean politics and society. Can the church return to a space above politics, and will this space have the same parameters as in the precoup period?
The Church and Pre-1973 Chilean Society Chile's pre-1973 political history contrasts sharply with that of most other Latin American countries. Not only did Chile enjoy one of the longest and strongest democratic traditions in the region, but its political party system was perhaps the most highly developed. From the 1930s, democratic competition in Chile depended largely on the parties' ability consistently to recruit new members and establish ties with new social groups. Thus, unlike in many countries that have yet to experience the "deepening of democracy," the evolution of the Chilean party system in which party elites spent a preponderance of their time maintaining and expanding clientelistic ties to their constituencies resulted in an extraordinarily high degree of party penetration into all areas of social life. Political parties served as the fulcrum of virtually all sociopolitical. activity, reinforcing and being reinforced by stable, multiclass political subcultures. According to Manuel Antonio Garreton, nonparty organizations "managed to become actors of national significance precisely to the extent that they were related to the party political structure.(4)
Another distinctive characteristic of the Chilean political system was the early emergence of primarily class-based political parties. By the end of the 1930s, the political arena was divided into rough thirds: a strong right, a viable center, and a well-institutionalized Marxist left. The relatively even distribution of We vote created incentives for party elites to engage in politics of accommodation and compromise instead of extralegal or extraconstitutional political strategies.
Because of the distinctive features of Chilean political development, the twentieth-century Chilean Catholic church had to devise a strategy for maintaining its influence in national society far earlier than other national churches that continued to rely on their relationships to dominant conservative parties or authoritarian regimes. Many Chilean church leaders, who initially felt threatened by the development of a democratic, class-based party system that included both traditionally anticlerical and Marxist parties, clung to the church's traditional alliance with the Conservative Party. However, a significant minority argued that severing the church's historical identification with the Conservative Party and withdrawing from the partisan political arena could strengthen the moral authority of the church. Maintaining an alliance with the Conservatives would only identify the church with the economic interests of traditional elites, and the church would risk losing the allegiance of the increasingly mobilized Chilean working and middle classes.(5) By the 1940s, under We progressive leadership of Cardinal José María Caro, the majority of the hierarchy came to agree that the church should remain above politics -- a position from which church leaders could address national issues without taint of partisan identification. Of course, in keeping with Vatican policy, the Chilean church uniformly opposed the parties of the Marxist left. Many within the church continued to sympathize openly with the Conservative Party, and a few, like Bishop Larraín of Talca, championed the so-called Social Christians (who later merged with several smaller parties to become the Christian Democratic Party).(6) However, the church as institution remained neutral.
The significance of the Chilean church's official withdrawal from partisan politics is threefold. The presence of new political and social associations competing for the allegiance of urban working and middle classes forced significant factions within the church into increasingly progressive theological and policy stances. In turn the church created its own organizations targeted at the working and middle classes and thus legitimated their interests and participation in national debates. Finally, unlike in a number of other Latin American countries where battles over religious issues continued to place the church at the center of national politics, social and class issues came to define the political agenda in Chile. National economic and political debates were framed largely by the political parties through which workers' and employers' associations articulated their demands. The church contributed to these national debates through a variety of public and private means, and its views influenced the Conservative and Christian Democratic parties' positions. But although the "above politics" stance increased the church's moral authority and influence, the post-1930s Chilean church did not wield the same degree of political power as did some other Latin American churches. The pattern of economic and political modernization in Chile resulted in a process of secularization and rationalization more common to Europe than to other Latin American countries.
Nevertheless, the church did play an important mediating role within the Chilean sociopolitical arena. On a number of significant occasions, political battles tempted church officials to equate Catholicism with particular partisan positions. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of the Chilean political system until the late 1960s was an intense competition between the Conservatives and Social Christians/Christian Democrats for the church's endorsement, and many within the church were happy to use their positions to bless publicly one or the other. However, both because of papal instructions to remain neutral(7) and precisely because the church itself was divided internally, the leadership preferred to avoid the potential dangers of partisan identification and to develop the church's own agenda separate from any party platform. Over time, the church's official neutrality came to be synonymous with not only an acceptance of but also a support for democracy. As others have described in detail, both in the 1970 election and especially in the latter half of Salvador Allende's tenure, the national church leadership hosted meetings between opposing politicians in an attempt to avoid the collapse of Chilean democracy.(8) The pre-1973 church's refusal to descend into the partisan fray from its official above-politics position(9)-- a move that could have eroded the delicate compromise between left and right and led to an earlier breakdown of democracy -- is arguably the most important contribution the church made in the fifty years before the coup.
The Church and Dictatorship: 1973-1983 To the surprise of many Chileans who had assumed that military personnel would simply "restore order" and return to their barracks, the military's postcoup behavior quickly demonstrated its more radical intent to restructure Chilean society and politics. Consistent with Cardoso's characterization of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, the military struck hard at eliminating the left and severely curtailed the scope of activities open to the center.(10) It was not until 1975, however, when the military adopted the neoliberal "Chicago-boys" economic model, that the ramifications of the goal to restructure society became evident. From the team of freemarket technocrats, the military adopted a set of policies consistent with both its desire to lead the country to rapid economic development and its aim to depoliticize Chilean society.
The economic logic behind these policies was to concentrate capital in the hands of "efficient" sectors (for example, private export enterprises where Chile is considered to have a comparative advantage) and to attract foreign investment. More important, the military hoped that simultaneous economic growth and the availability of cheap, imported consumer goods resulting from a reduction of trade barriers would eliminate political party allegiance. With economic prosperity and the satisfaction of consumer demands, the military planned to transform permanently the democratic tradition of channeling demands through political parties to the state to a more "stable" state structure that satisfied the majority's demands from above.(11) In some ways, it can be argued that the military initially succeeded. The rightist parties simply disbanded in favor of the new regime, and the combination of sophisticated repression and the economic boom of the late 1970s enabled the state effectively to shut down the center and left and fragment the opposition.
This strategy was common to Latin American militaries' self-appointed mission as defined by the national security state ideology, but it had a special significance in Chile. As Manuel Garreton argues:
The elimination of the party political arena and of the political system was not simply the elimination of a channel for demands, as in other Latin American societies. In the Chilean case, it meant the destruction of the principal mode by which social actors and subjects were constituted. Thus in breaking up the political system the military took a step which was both reactive and transformative.(12)Because Chilean democracy had been built around the political party structure, the military's success in driving the parties underground allowed the government to disarticulate the various sectors of society (for example, campesinos, students, pobladores, and others) in a successful divide-and-conquer strategy.Into the political void created by the military policies stepped the Catholic church. Until 1983, the church served as virtually the only channel through which opposition to the Pinochet regime could be voiced. By the late 1970s, church leaders began issuing stronger and more pointed public criticisms of the regime's human rights violations as well as its social and economic policies. Scores of new church or church-affiliated neighborhood, academic, and workers' organizations were created to facilitate especially working-class Chileans' social, political and economic struggles against the regime. To the extent that a democratic space remained open between 1973 and 1983 in which the opposition could survive, it was provided largely by the church.
The church's willingness to provide a "protective umbrella" had important consequences for the Chilean opposition. First, until 1983 the traditional parties, particularly on the left, managed to preserve their basic structures and contacts with their bases primarily because of the (albeit limited) space provided by the church. More importantly, a slow mobilization of a network of grassroots social organizations began under the protection of the church that was new to the traditionally party-dominated Chilean sociopolitical arena. Much of the initial organization was defensive in nature: A host of such resources as ollas comunes (community kitchens) and community self-help groups were born to fulfill needs created by the military's economic and political policies.(13) By the 1980s an additional network of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) emerged to provide new avenues for organization of specific interests. Many NGOs were founded by the church itself or by groups with close links to the church. Although these new NGOs differed substantially in the specificity of their constituencies and level of local, regional, and national organization, they represented a partial transformation of the historical political arena in Chile.
The church's leadership role under the military dictatorship strengthened dramatically the relationship between church and some sectors of society. Certainly, if "influence" is measured by the degree of salience the church has in individuals' lives, then the willingness of the church to serve as a surrogate for the suppressed parties and unions greatly expanded church influence in Chile. Relations between the church and the left were never better. In working-class neighborhoods where survival often depended on church or church-sponsored self-help, community organizing, or human rights groups, We church became far more visible than it was in the years preceding the coup. Many involved in church work or base Christian communities experienced a revitalization of their religious faith that continues to strengthen the ties that bind together the church-as-institution and the church-as-community of faithful. In many ways, by the early 1980s the church had become a far stronger institution than it had been before the Coup?(14) One indicator of this increased influence is the dramatic rise in numbers of seminarians in Chile, from 111 in 1972 to 946 in 1987, or a 752 percent increase.(15)
On the other hand, the church's willingness to assume vital political functions placed the church at the center of the political arena for perhaps the first time since its disestablishment in 1925. For many including Pinochet, the church itself became a critical political issue. In the absence of political parties or other properly "political" actors to define national issues, Pinochet successfully reduced the political agenda to a single issue: support or opposition to the military regime. Clearly defined institutional mechanisms were not necessary for channeling support for the regime. And given that virtually every institution that could channel opposition had been outlawed but the church, Pinochet could accuse the church's Vicaría de Solidaridad and its leadership of being "more communist than the communists themselves."
The price of leadership, then, was a perceived politicization. The church gained a new relationship with the poor and working class, but it lost authority among the wealthy and the rightwing. It was not uncommon to hear regime supporters say that they were Catholic but owed no obedience to Chilean prelates, especially to such outspoken opponents of the regime as Cardinal Raoúl Silva Henríquez or Bishops Carlos Camus or Tomás Gonzalez. The church's reduction to a "mere political actor" in the eyes of the right also resulted in frequent attacks, both verbal and physical. Other less obvious costs were exacted as well. Pinochet, in an effort to undermine the church's authority throughout Chilean society, courted leaders of Pentecostal churches. Non-Catholic and particularly Pentecostal churches have grown at a phenomenal rate in the past twenty-five years, and estimates are that as many as 20 percent of the Chilean population are practicing non-Catholics, 90 percent of whom are Pentecostal.(16) This is a religious challenge to the Catholic church of the first magnitude. Pinochet for the first time opened the ranks of the military to non-Catholic evangelization and extended social benefits to Protestant ministers and their families that had been reserved to Catholic personnel in the past. In return, top military brass were celebrated at an annual Acción de gracias hosed by the Methodist Pentecostal Church, the largest non-Catholic church in Chile. This annual event alone lent a legitimacy to non-Catholic churches that they had never enjoyed historically in Chilean society.
Even the most progressive and activist members of the hierarchy recognized the institutional costs of having the church involved in leading the struggle for democracy in Chile. But until other actors emerged to fulfill the functions of an opposition, most felt that the church could not morally retreat or return to its previous role above politics. In turn, without the church to preserve a space for democratic opposition, it seemed unlikely that other actors could emerge to take on the church's more political functions. Underlying the broad consensus regarding the church's role in supporting democracy and protecting human rights, however, lay a fundamental tension between those who yearned to reestablish a more pastoral line within the church and those who supported the church's new activist role in Chilean society. This tension flared after the emergence of the Chilean protest movement in 1983.
The Reemergence of the Party System
and Transition to Democracy: 1983-1989On May 11, 1983, Chileans responded to a call to protest issued by the leadership of the national copper-workers' union in numbers that astounded even the organizers of the event. This national protest, the first in ten years of military rule in Chile, marked the formal beginning of the process that led to the democratic transition in late 1989. In the wake of its overwhelming success, the opposition parties vowed to call monthly demonstrations for airing the Chilean people's demand for a return to democratic rule and an end of the Pinochet regime. Political elites from the center and left rapidly reconsolidated their party structures and solidified their political positions in order to take advantage of the reawakened mobilization potential. Clearly, the military had grossly un derestimated the depth and endurance of the societal cleavages underlying party allegiance in Chile. The parties had not withered away, but had maintained their links to civil society through a host of informal associations -- for example, professional organizations, student associations, even sports clubs-many of which had been provided or protected by the church after the coup. Although there has been some change in the lineup of political parties since 1973, it is remarkable the degree to which virtually the identical political parties and leadership cadres that existed before the coup reemerged after a decade of repression.(17)
The revitalization of party politics in 1983 signaled a new hope for democracy in Chile, but the immediate result was an intensification of party competition and ideological rigidification that initially hindered progress toward the ouster of the military. Because of the success of the first protests, the major opposition parties and alliances fell prey to an "election mentality "-their immediate goal became the demonstration of party strength rather than subordination of party interests to the goal of unifying a cohesive opposition movement. Moreover, both the extreme left and right erected obstacles to broad cooperation across the political spectrum. The democratic right refused to participate in any coalition that included the Communist Party (PC), especially after the attempt on Pinochet's life in 1986 and the discovery of caches of arms allegedly linked to the communists in 1987. The PC, on the other hand, refused to abandon its legitimation of violence as a potential strategy for struggle or its ties to the extremist Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR). All of these factors reduced the possibility of constructing a coalition capable of either ousting the military or offering a political alternative attractive enough to induce the officers to step down.
At the same time that the protest movement erupted, the Catholic church experienced several significant internal changes that would affect the prospects for democracy. The most important of these changes was the retirement of Cardinal Raoúl Silva Henríquez and his replacement with Juan Francisco Fresno. Fresno was widely considered to be sympathetic to the military regime before he became head of the Santiago diocese.(18) A traditional man of the church, Fresno maintained a sharp distinction between the public and the private, the pastoral and the political. In his view, the church's authority should be consigned to the religious realm of person's life; public life should be left to the authority of the state and political actors. Thus for Fresno, the legitimate role of the church excluded any activities that could compromise the integrity of its pastoral mission by placing it on either side of temporal, political issues. He argued that the hierarchy's apparent endorsement of the opposition and its political goals in the late 1970s and early 1980s reinforced the divisions in Chilean society, alienated many believers from the saving grace of the church, and contributed to the loss of the church's moral authority. For Fresno, the church should not become the ally of any one group or organization, nor should the hierarchy perform the functions of a political party, trade union, or state apparatus.
Because Fresno's vision of the proper role of the church in Chilean society appeared to differ markedly from that of Cardinal Silva Henríquez, many in the opposition, and especially the left, feared that the struggle to oust the military government would be weakened. Privately, many argued that a nonpolitical Church would simply legitimize the status quo. For their part, the military and the right anticipated that the church would, if not legitimate the military regime, put an end to its role in maintaining international attention on the regime's human rights abuses and in sheltering domestic pressure to restore democracy.
Fresno's appointment also highlighted the tension within the church between more activist progressives and traditionalists who emphasize the church's pastoral versus social mission. The Chilean church has never suffered the kind of horizontal cleavage that has divided contemporary Nicaraguan church elites from the so-called popular, or parallel, church. However, tensions have existed for decades between bishops and between bishops and clergy over the line distinguishing between pastoral care and partisan activity -- between mediation and political meddling. In the several years following the coup, the extreme nature of the military's socioeconomic and security policies muted previous debates over such issues as liberation theology and the meaning of the church's preferential option for the poor. But as the church moved into ever-wider areas of social responsibility and its protective umbrella extended further and further, the old debate over the legitimate role of the church re-emerged.
Moreover, church elites like Fresno pointed to surveys indicating that the Pentecostal sects predominate in a number of Santiago poblaciones where the Catholic church has difficulty providing basic pastoral services because of a chronic shortage of priests. Loses among the lower classes, coupled with substantial alienation of much of the upper classes over the church's apparent endorsement of the opposition, strengthened the argument of the traditionalists who hearkened back to the church's more pastoral, less activist pre-1973 position. Others, notably Bishops Camus of Linares and Gonzdlez of Talca repeatedly spoke out against the military regime and publicly endorsed the opposition. In an interview with El Mercurio, Bishop Camus stated that given the depths of immorality of the military regime, virtually any form of opposition would be warranted and legitimate, calling the authors of the assassination attempt on Pinochet "heroes."(19) Bernardino Piñera, in his capacity as president of the Episcopal Conference, described the nature of the divisions within the church in a statement made to John Paul II during the papal visit in 1987:
When we (the Episcopal Conference) meet twice a year, some difficulties arise. Those of the strictly pastoral order are no the most grave, but they exist. The diverse currents of thought in the universal church ... also divide us. More difficult to reconcile are the differences in judging the reality of the country -- social and cultural, but also economic and political -- and the attitude that our episcopacy should, adopt toward it.(20)In spite of the concern produced by Fresno's promotion, both within the opposition as well as the church, his insistence on the reassertion of the church's pastoral and mediational roles allowed the church to play a decisive role in the exceedingly difficult process leading to Pinochet's defeat in the 1989 plebiscite. Fresno's first attempt to alter the church's role was an offer in 1983 to host meetings between the Democratic Alliance (AD) and the government.(21) Adker several meetings, the dialogue fell apart because the representatives of the government did not appear to have the power to commit the government to concrete steps toward redemocratization. More importantly, the talks excluded the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), the Marxist opposition alliance having as As largest member me Communist Party. In order to stall negotiations, the government insisted that the AD publicly deny the Communist Party any role in the future of the country. While the AD wavered on this issue, the MDP launched a series of its own protests to demonstrate that any transition excluding the left would be doomed. The net result of the failed talks were (1) greater polarization and distrust between opposition alliances, (2) greater unease on the right and hence a greater tendency to continue support for Pinochet, and (3) embarrassment on the part of the church. In the end, Fresno, who had committed the moral force of the church behind sponsoring dialogue, was forced to issue a statement defending the leaders of the AD for their decision to abandon the talks; in effect, he placed the blame for the breakdown on the government for refusing to offer any timetable for the transition on the basis of which the talks could continue.
The failed attempt at dialogue was a turning point for Fresno. Because both the right and the military had misread Fresno's call for a nonpolitical church as a call for an antipolitical church, his role in me attempts at negotiation were men as a betrayal. By virtue of hosting a dialogue, Fresno in effect endorsed democracy and legitimated the centrist opposition (if not the opposition in the MDP). By blaming the government for the breakdown in talks, Fresno refused to lend the church's unconditional support for the military. As a result, the number of physical and verbal attacks on churches and church personnel increased dramatically after an initial lull following Fresno's appointment.
Attacks on the church were significant beyond the physical violence to either church property or personnel. Government attacks were a direct assault on the integrity and the authority of the church. Even for church leaders such as Cardinal Fresno who sincerely desired to pull the church within the boundaries of legitimate pastoral activity, such attacks could not be tolerated. Regardless of the inevitable politicized interpretation, the hierarchy had to lodge official protest to direct assaults, a response that in turn further strained church-state relations and complicated Fresno's ability to play the mediational role he desired.
Cardinal Fresno was more successful in providing a forum for dialogue between moderate opposition parties seeking bases for mutual cooperation. After a series of negotiations hosted by the cardinal, the National Accord for the Transition to Full Democracy was born on August 15, 1985. This alliance, which included a broad spectrum from the democratic right to sectors of the left, raised anew Chileans' hopes for a broad front capable of pushing the military from power. Once again, however, the accord proved to be weaker than the traditional cleavages between the left and the right. Fear of the left led the right to lend only lukewarm support to the mobilization efforts of the alliance. The moderate Socialists faced a loss of potential support to a seemingly more,militant Communist Party and socialist faction still withiin the MDP. And the Christian Democrats in the center remained pulled between left- and right-leaning factions either supporting or eschewing cooperation with the Marxist left.
Pope John Paul II's visit to Chile in April 1987 gave the national leadership a renewed impetus for unification. The slogan for the pope's six-day visit was "Messenger for Life." The pope repeatedly stressed dialogue, reconciliation, nonviolence, and forgiveness-studiously nonpolitical words designed to deny any group the opportunity of using the pope's visit for partisan purposes. In both words and actions, John Paul II fully supported Fresno's vision of the church as a mediator. Consistent with the Chilean church's traditional support for democracy, the pope endorsed the government's official commitment to a transition beginning in 1989: "Man is naturally inclined to organize political and legal structures. All citizens, without exception, should have the chance to freely and actively participate in the establishment of the legal foundations of the Political community, and in the administration of public allikq in the determination of areas of action and boundaries of the different institutions, and in the election of public officials."(22) The pope also made clear that the church would exert not only a mediating but also a moderating influence and that the goals he identified must be achieved through negotiation and dialogue: "Violence is not Christian. Violence is not evangelical. Violence is not a path to solving the real difficulties of individuals or the people.(23)
The pope's full endorsement of democracy had an enormous symbolic impact on the Chilean political scene at a time when the improving economy and opposition fragmentation had strengthened Pinochet's position. But more importantly, the pope helped rekindle hopes of opposition unity by meeting with representatives from an extraordinarily broad array of opposition actors, from human rights and neighborhood groups to officials of all the opposition parties, including the Communist Party. In order to demonstrate his understanding of Chilean politics, public appearances were staged at such places as the National Stadium, the scene of such brutality in the months following the coup. Yet while confronting squarely the most vivid symbols of repression and state-led violence, the pope repeatedly emphasized the need for dialogue, reconciliation, and compromise. His message was clear: Chile's hope lay in a peaceful transition in which nonextremist forces, both civilian and military, mutually agreed in advance to specific steps and shared rules of the political game. The role of the church should not be so much to participate in the negotiations over specific steps or political procedures, as to facilitate the discussion and to provide a forum for its pursuit.
Perhaps the most important immediate consequence of the pope's visit was the recapturing of some of the influence the church had lost among the right and Pinochet's supporters. One representative of the rightist National Party (PN) said before the plebiscite:
There is no doubt that the church has enormous influence in spite of the fact that we live in an increasingly secularized world. On one hand, it has great temporal power and on the other hand, it has an enormous moral reserve. The best expression of the latter is the pope's recent visit. Perhaps there has never been such a powerful call to come together in this country.(24)That the pope was careful to commit the church to respect for human rights and democracy and not to specific proposals that could be viewed as partisan was well noted by the (at least democratic) right.Nevertheless, the right continued to insist that although it might be the church's legitimate function to facilitate political dialogue, the church should only exercise this function under extraordinary circumstances. "Today in Chilean politics, there are two actors facing one another that paradoxically should not be political actors: the armed forces and the church.... This is one of the central distortions of Chilean politics, this dislocation of the natural institutional role.(25) John Paul II's firm rejection of the church's political role helped facilitate the right's legitimation of its mediational role; however, the question of the boundary between pastoral and political remained crucial to the right. As one leader of the National Party asked: "How far can the church go? How far can the church push [into Politics]?"(26) Another National Party militant answered:
I would say that the church has a great mission to accomplish .... [T]he church should disseminate the fundamental Christian message ... which naturally inspires people-civilian leaders, the laity-to realize this message through unified actions of reconciliation, legality, respect for human rights, opposition to dictatorship. [But] the practical application of this message must be brought about by the Catholic lay leaders. I must do it, as a politician, not Bishop Camus. Bishop Camus can talk with me and I talk with the press, but he should not talk to the press.(27)What Now? General Pinochet's defeat in the plebiscite on October 5, 1988, is one of the more dramatic events in recent Latin American politics. Supporters of the regime were convinced that given a yes-no choice for Pinochet, the majority of voters would choose to continue being ruled by the military, which was portrayed as the guarantor of economic growth, stability, and anti-Marxist law and order. The victory of the "no" forces, which grouped together seventeen parties ranging from a newly moderate leftist faction of the Socialist Party to the center right, is a remarkable story of political cooperation and restraint. In spite of improved economic conditions and state manipulation of such resources as the national media, the "no" faction won 55 percent of the vote with 90 percent voter turnout. The next step in the transition was a three-way presidential race scheduled for December 1989 between Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin, who headed the coalition of seventeen parties that formed the Concertation for Democracy (CPD), and two conservative candidates: Hernán Buchi and Francisco Javier Errázuriz. The military, not surprisingly, manipulated the electoral rules of the game to ensure a rightist victory in the presidential as well as congressional elections-for example, by gerrymandering congressional districts and manipulating the political party laws. Not only did the CPD parties successfully unite behind Aylwin's candidacy, but they managed to put together a single list of national congressional candidates. Aylwin's election and the CPD victory in both congressional houses can be seen as a testimony not only to the ultimate failure of the Pinochet regime to depoliticize Chilean society but also to the strength of Chileans' political will to overcome the obstacles to democratic transition erected either by the military or traditionally narrow partisan self-interests.
The party leadership's ability to overcome previous animosities as well as the logic of electoral competition confirmed observers' belief that the historical strength of the Chilean party system provided the best hope for democracy. Certainly, the most distinctive feature of the Chilean transition to democracy is the degree of resilience not only of the particular parties but also of the party leaderships. A remarkably high perentage of the top officeholders today were political leaders in 1973.
However, this party and leadership resilience may present the most profound political challenge for the immediate future of Chilean democracy. The transition was possible to the extent that (in many cases) the same politicians who could not resolve their differences before the 1973 coup successfully negotiated both the CPD's national program as well as the often more thorny, practical questions of how to allocate political resources and authority to seventeen parties ranging a broad political spectrum. Yet in order to achieve this degree of political cohesion, the party leaderships have exercised firm control over their constituencies, resulting in a degree of disaffection with the political leadership, especially among the youth and the pobladores. These two groups particularly served as the vanguard of mobilization after 1983 and claim responsibility for opening the space within which the party elites could operate for the first time since the coup. Grassroots leaders' perception that the transition was negotiated (albeit successfully) over their heads at the potential expense of legitimate demands and interests contributes to this sense of alienation.
As the difficult problems inherited by the Aylwin government go unresolved, these tensions could flare. Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley has made it clear that the government plans to maintain the military's basic export-oriented, free-market development strategy with modifications only to provide for increased social spending.(28) A study published by the National Institute of Statistics shows that whereas consumption for the average family remained stable between 1978 and 1988, consumption for the poorest 20 percent of the population dropped 15.4 percent. At the same time, intake of the wealthiest 20 percent rose 7.6 percent.(29) In spite of the government's initial prediction of an increase of 20 percent in expenditures in health, housing, and education between 1989 and 1991, the 1991 budget resolution introduced in Congress in September 1990 revealed that public spending remained virtually the same in 1989 and 1990 with only a 7 percent increase in 1991.(30) The government's position, in apparent agreement with the leadership of all the CPD parties, is that this economic model maximizes Chile's potential for economic growth, yet increasing criticism can be expected from the poorest sectors whose lifestyles were further squeezed by a 36 percent increase in the consumer price index in 1990.(31)
These statistics, coupled with the 17 percent of government spending allocated to the military in 1990, could prove to be powerful political symbols in the future. Moreover, although the government has passed legislation increasing the power of negotiation for workers and legally recognizing the United Alliance for Workers (CUT), CUT President Manuel Bustos asserts that these reforms are "insufficient and it will be necessary to continue fighting for a radical reform of the Work Code imposed by the dictatorship.(32) In addition to issues of economic justice and distribution, items remaining high on the Aylwin government agenda will be reform of the penal code, effective civilian control over the security forces (particularly the former Central Nacional de Informaciones [CNI] officials), and a resolution of human rights violations of the past regime. All of these issues are politically explosive, and none will be easily resolved. Not only do governmental policy initiatives have to be negotiated with the seventeen CPD parties, but the 1980 constitution allowed Pinochet to designate nine of the forty-seven senators and all of the mayors as well as to control the courts and the army, giving the promilitary opposition an effective veto over government policy. In late 1991, resolution of these matters remained under intense negotiation.
A crisis of expectations is probably inevitable among sectors that expected to see immediate and structural solutions to their demands from the new regime. Such a crisis would present a fundamental political challenge to the party leadership (and hence the government). It should be noted here that the Communist Party (PC), which historically would have served as a natural channel for this discontent, has been decimated by the transition process. The voters' rejection of the PC and its post-1980 abandonment of the electoral process have left the party plagued by internal bickering, public and massive resignations of longtime and prominent Communist leaders, and acrimonious expulsions of dissenters. On the other hand, a network of organizations that could serve as an alternative to the traditional parties for grassroots mobilization exists that did not exist before 1973. Significant mobilization through nonparty structures could undermine the very strength of the party system that supports the current democratic compromise of the CPD parties. Moreover, if nonparty organizations successfully mobilize public opinion in an attempt to affect the terms of national debate (for example, over economic policy), the cohesion of the political consensus in the CPD could fray. Speaking as a representative of the CPD, Enrique Krauss referred explicitly to the danger of competition between the traditional parties and grassroots organizations at a conference of ninety-seven NGOs in September 1989:
I am one of those who is conscious of the fact that the way of doing politics in Chile has changed.... [In] these 16 years our people ... learned to construct their own solutions.... What Aylwin and the Concertation hope is that the solutions to the extremely grave problems that to some degree will be exacerbated after March 11 [the inaugural date for the new president] will come from the social base.(33)A crisis of expectations would present a new challenge to the church as well. Because much of the organizational work has occurred through church-affiliated base Christian communities and NGOs or groups Protected by the church, tension between party and nonparty leaders could create a dilemma for bishops who want to support the new regime but also maintain the influence that the church has gained through its new institutional ties with the popular sectors. It is not clear what it would mean to remain "above politics" in this case. In the traditionally partydominated political system, remaining above politics meant refusing to endorse any partisan agenda or equating Catholicism with participation in a particular party. Historically, a consensus about the distinction between pastoral and political was difficult enough to attain in a system defined by electoral competition between national parties. But today, the church cannot return to a pre-1973 position merely above parties in order to be above politics. Much of what is "political" is now expressed through the church's own roots that extend throughout Chilean society.As in 1983 when changes within the political scene coincided with the appointment of a new archbishop of Santiago, the retirement of Cardinal Juan Fresno in 1989 left the Vatican with the opportunity to choose new leadership for the challenges brought with redemocratization. Many within the church and the political left initially hoped for the naming of a more progressive archbishop than they perceived Fresno to be, but realistically it appeared unlikely that a candidate from the more progressive sector of the church (for example, Bishops Camus or Gonzalez) would be chosen given that the Vatican had filled virtually every new position in the 1980s with a "conservative." For example, Archbishop of Concepción Antonio Moreno, the Vatican's most recent appointment before Fresno's resignation, is widely considered to be an active supporter of the military. Bishop Jorge Medina was the candidate most often mentioned as a possible choice for the next appointment and the one most opposed by the Progressives. Progressives recognized the necessity of mobilizing pressure in Rome for a sympathetic appointment but it was the elevation of Adolfo Rodríguez (the head of the rightist clerical group Opus Dei) to episcopal status that precipitated what was known as "the red alert."
The first step was taken by a group of women who wrote to nuncio Giulio Einaudi saying:
Have pity on the thousands of disappeared, tortured, exiled, unemployed [whose] voices are raised demanding justice and social revindication. For us, it would be a great affliction and a scandal for our people if the naming [of the new Archbishop] fell on someone who ... had remained silent or, worse, had worked in complicity with the military government that has assaulted the dignity of mankind and the values of the Gospel.(34)Another group of laity issued a statement accusing Medina of "sympathy and identification with the dictatorship that has oppressed the Chilean people for sixteen years."(35) The national effort to prevent the naming of Medina included extensive use of public graffiti, distribution of petitions through parishes and church organizations, and a letter-writing campaign to the forty-two cardinals in the Bishops Congregation and the other Episcopal Conferences.(36) Under these conditions, the naming of Bishop of Antofagasta Carlos Oviedo, in spite of his self-identification as a conservative, was considered a victory for the Progressives.[H]e is a man of recognized obedience to the Pope and Vatican policy, who in the vulgar classification between progressives and conservatives classifies himself as the latter, [but also] he is a priest with great pastoral endowment, preparation, open to dialogue, very receptive to the problems of the popular sectors and not indifferent to the problems of human rights.(37)Oviedo's history of work on behalf of prisoners (both common and political) and public commitment to human rights, democracy, and the needs of the poor have been highlighted by the progressive sectors of the church.Archbishop Oviedo also is welcomed by the right. He has used every public opportunity to reaffirm the church's "commitment to be a sign, instrument and endorsement of unity . . . serving everyone with full political independence in such a way that we can shelter everyone ... so that no one feels rejected, excluded or scorned."(38) In his first major interview after his appointment, the new archbishop described himself as "friend of the poor and the rich, pastor of all and for all."(39) Added to the fact that Oviedo thinks of himself as a "priest's priest"(40) and refuses to be placed on a political spectrum, he follows the pope's lead carefully on intrachurch issues. On liberation theology he states: "When liberation theology substitutes the poor or the people for Jesus Christ, clearly that is not theology.... [T]hose who follow it [liberation theology) without knowing theology have been quite confused."(41) About the so-called popular church he states: "In general, I can say that a church that calls itself popular means that it is not in communion with its bishop, that it is marginalized from him. That is not the Catholic church because the Catholic church is a church-communion guided by its pastor through the will of Jesus Christ."(42) Oviedo, in some ways like Fresno, articulates a traditional view of the church more than a conservative political agenda.(43)
Oviedo's task as the leader of the Santiago diocese (which houses much of the bureaucracy of the church's new commitments) as well as that of the rest of the hierarchy is to define the location of the church's space in the new democratic order. Consistent with its pre-1973 position, the church's most recent pastoral agenda for 1991-1994 is a full endorsement of democracy. The bishops say: "It is necessary to create an authentically pluralistic and respectful society, without ignoring the moral principles that rest in the nature and dignity of man, and that are a reflection for believers of God's wisdom. Democracy offers a framework for these aspirations.(44) This pastoral plan, however, also can be viewed as an attempt among men of differing persuasions to carve out those areas of legitimate church support for the project of building a democracy. The bishops, collective statement is an attempt to return to a space above politics without giving up the new spaces conquered during a punishing sixteen years of dictatorship.
Archbishop Oviedo and the Episcopal Conference have consistently stated that although the church is nonpartisan, it has a central role to play in the ongoing process of national reconciliation. Reconciliation includes "closing wounds in the climate of truth, justice and pardon. It does not mean leaving wounds without healing, but neither does it mean wanting revenge. God's justice is expressed, before all in mercy."(45) The bishops identify the church's mission, in part, as forming individuals' consciousness of the Christian values that must underlie true reconciliation.
At the same time, reconciliation cannot be achieved wholly in the hearts of individuals. The church's position is that reconciliation requires disclosure of the truth about the abuses, especially the human rights violations, of the past regime. Thus, the church, particularly through the legal department of the Vicaría de Solidaridad, continued its crucial work in gathering human rights information in cooperation with the government's Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (the Rettig Commission), which gave its final report in May 1991.(46) The Aylwin government charged the commission with collecting testimonies concerning human rights violations (although limited to those resulting in death) during the military regime in order to obtain an officially recognized accounting of abuses. Under pressure to address the demands for justice from the families of victims of repression, the government has embraced the call for national reconciliation based on truth. On the one hand, the government acknowledges the necessity of publicly recognizing previous abuses; on the other, it has argued that "revenge" will only further divide Chileans and has called on victims' families to contribute to reconciliation through forgiveness.
Oviedo has tried to steer clear of the explosive political question of whether reconciliation requires justice, meaning the trying of human rights abusers in the civilian courts. But there has been an inevitable outcry for criminal proceedings from sectors of the left and victims' families, many of whom have organized through church or church-affiliated organizations like the Vicaría de Solidaridad.(47) Part of the complaint is that names of those responsible for violations should have been published and that the information should not merely have been passed on to the courts to pursue. The courts proved quite ineffectual in protecting human rights under the military government, and until the judicial system is restructured to provide more autonomy from the legacy of the Pinochet years, few anticipate that the courts can adequately pursue the issue of criminal responsibility. The courts are further hampered by an amnesty lam, passed by the military as well as constitutional fetters tying the hands of the judges. Thus, many within the human rights organizations feel less than sanguine about the achievement of real justice for past abuses. Finally, leaders of the organizations of the victims' families reject the proposal to set up a system of monetary reparations if it is unaccompanied by tangible steps to bring known perpetrators of violence to justice. Because of the church's central position in the human rights movement in Chile, the tensions between the government's attempt to heal past wounds and the cry for greater justice from many who depended on the church for sustenance will place the church in a very difficult position.
It is likely, however, that the church's commitment to the theme of reconciliation will distance the institutional church from the sectors demanding justice. President Aylwin, invoking Pope John Paul II's words during his visit, stated during his address to the nation concerning the commission's report: "Chile has a vocation for understanding and not for confrontation. We cannot progress by digging deeper into division. It is time for pardon and reconciliation."(48) The wave of terrorism (from both the extreme right and left), particularly the assassinations of Jaime Guzmdn (leader of the rightist Independent Democratic Union [UDI], the party most closely aligned to the military) as well as others known to be human rights violators, strengthens the view that reconciliation and pardon are necessary for the consolidation of the new political order. Unfortunately for the victims' families, the pervading view that terrorism is on the rise and constitutes the greatest challenge to the Chilean system helps marginalize the legitimate claim for a more energetic pursuit of those responsible for violations who are still housed within the military and carabineros.(49) It is especially regrettable given that the military's response to the commission's report was a complete rejection of responsibility for any abuses; the military insisted instead that "the report overlooks ... the subversive war situation existing during the period.... To any serious armed institution faced with a war situation, the only objective to be pursued should be total victory."(50) General Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, former director of Dirección de Intelligencia (DINA), said of the Rettig report: "They [the Rettig Commission] only listed the false declarations of the same Marxists defeated yesterday and today supported by the Vicaría de Solidaridad, where infiltrated Marxists exist, with and without priests' robes."(51)
The concept of reconciliation does stretch to include the hierarchy's continued preferential option for the poor. Although the bishops state that the export-led strategy of the military has "with great sacrifices modernized and perfected ... the country's economic structure and productive system," they also say that reconciliation is jeopardized by the "unjust distance" this policy has created between social classes.(52) Not only does the church call the privileged to charity but also to "distributive justice" because "Chile should not be a country of great economic and social differences,"(53) As of late 1991 the left is fragmented between a Communist Party in disarray and a newly moderate tendency within the majority of socialist factions. As a consequence, no political party or movement currently is articulating an alternative economic model to the modified export-led strategy proposed by the Aylwin government. In contrast, the rightist opposition can be divided on issues such as the degree of civilian control over the military, but these opposition parties have demonstrated a remarkable unity on their long-term economic interests. That the church continues to assert an economic vision of a preferential option for the poor (and that it fits this vision within the concept of reconciliation) leaves a space open for those who would like to assert alternatives to export-oriented growth. This issue, perhaps more than any other, will go to the heart of Chilean politics in the next decade.
It is clear, then, that Oviedo, like Fresno before him, intends to pull the church back to a position above politics and restore to the church a pastoral orientation that is inclusive and nonpartisan. This is a goal that is fully supported by the Vatican as well as others within the Chilean hierarchy. However, the exact parameters and the location of this position above politics are not clear. Beneath a general democratic consensus, the hierarchy remains divided-between political liberals and conservatives and between theological progressives and traditionalists. But the choice is no longer merely between partisan agendas or between pastoral versus political activity. The choice is between claiming the legitimate right to continue to champion the interests of the popular and grassroots groups now found within the church or supporting democratic stability achieved through the firm control of national party leaders. The church risks loss of hard-won national influence if it cedes setting the national agenda to properly "political" organizations. For grassroots leaders for whom the church offered not only solace but also organizational structure for the mobilization of their demands during the dictatorship, a perception that bishops are retreating to a position above politics could lead to an atrophying of the church's new roots in Chilean society. Yet the church risks loss of moral authority if it continues to provide nonparty channels for the expression of many Chileans' demands of the new democratic government. Given that the church now must "compete" with a variety of aggressively evangelizing non-Catholic churches and sects, many within the hierarchy argue that the church must reassert the universality of its message and concentrate its efforts on responding to the often unmet pastoral needs of the Chilean population. According to this view, not only should the church avoid alienating the conservative wealthy, but it must strengthen As pastoral presence among the poor in order to prevent their defection to rival religious institutions.
The prospects for the Catholic church in the next years are not clear. On one hand, the fears of many progressives that the church will simply retreat to its pre-1973 space are probably unfounded. The pattern of institutionalization of Chilean civil society has been transformed to some extent, primarily through church or church-related organizations. The same space above politics simply does not exist to retreat to, nor will many within the church be willing to forfeit the influence that the church has gained by trying to recreate exactly the same space. On the other hand, the Chilean church has a historical commitment to democracy; moreover, the hierarchy understands that the church has much greater flexibility to develop its own sphere of moral influence separate from national or parusan actors in a democracy. To the extent that the full transition to democracy in the next few years probably will require a degree of control exercised by party elites over their grassroots constituencies, the bishops will not stress the mobilization potential of church organizations as they did during the dictatorship. Some sectors within the church may well argue that in spite of redemocratization, the reemergence of party-dominated politics leaves them without a voice. To the extent that these are the same sectors that came to depend on the church to serve as the voice of the voiceless, the bishops' position will be perceived as a fundamental retreat.
Notes 1. See, for example, Ivan Vallier, "Church 'Development' in Latin America: A Five Country Comparison," in Karl M. Schmitt, ed., The Roman Catholic Church in Modern Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), pp.167-193.
2. Thomas G. Sanders, "The Chilean Episcopate: An Institution in Transition," in Schmitt, The Roman Catholic Church, pp. 105-138; Brian Smith, The Church and Politics in Chile (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982). For a differing view, see David Mutchler, The Church as Political Factor (New York: Praeger, 1971).
3. See, for example, Thomas G. Sanders, "Catholicism and Authoritarianism in Chile," Thought.- A Review of Culture and Ideas 59 (June 1984), pp. 229-243; Brian Smith, "Chile: Deepening the Allegiance of the Working-Class Sector to the Church in the 1970s," in Daniel H. Levine, ed., Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), pp. 156-186. See also Sanders, "The Chilean Episcopate"; Smith, The Church; and Mutchler, The Church.
4. Manuel Antonio Garretón, "The Political Evolution of the Chilean Military Regime and the Problems in the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philipe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 96.
5. By the end of the 1930s, the transformation of the Chilean political system Into one defined by class-based parties led the Conservative and Liberal parties, traditional enemies, to ally in a right-wing electoral coalition based on shared economic interests. Thus, the Conservative Party continued to proclaim its proclerical roots, but its primary function had become representation of economic Interests. The Conservative-Liberal alliance in turn made the argument for a church-Conservative alliance based on proclericalism difficult to sustain for Conservative sympathizers within the church.
6. That many within the church advocated maintaining political alliance with the Conservative Party is not surprising given that the rapid influx into the political arena of new urban sectors resulted in substantial gains by the Marxist and radical parties that produced a fair degree of concern within the church about potential anticlerical persecution.
7. The first such Vatican instructions came in the form of a letter from Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli (later Pope Pius XII) in 1933. For an explanation of events leading to Pacelli's letter, see Hannah W. Stewart-Gambino, The Catholic Church and Politics in the Chilean Countryside, 1925-1964 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992).
8. By the final days of the Allende period, significant numbers of church elites, like the majority of Chilean citizens, welcomed the coup as a necessary corrective measure to deal with a chaotic political situation.
9. It is important to note that days before the coup, Cardinal Silva Henriquez called on the military to step in to restore order, a request indicating the degree to which the hierarchy thought things had gotten out of control.
10. Fernando H. Cardoso, "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 45-49.
11. Jaime Guzmán best articulated this argument before the military coup in an article in El Mercurio, December 26,1981. He argued that underdevelopment engenders irresponsible parties that artificially create political divisions by seeking votes on the basis of ideological promises to the politically naive and economically disenfranchised. The solution to this problem is economic growth "from above" that would undermine the artificial bases of Marxist electoral support, create political "stability," and lead to "responsible" political elites. Cited in Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Partidos de oposición bajo el régimen autoritario chileno," Revista Mexicana de Sociología XLIV, no. 2 (Abril-Junio 1982), pp. 606-607.
12. Garretón, "The Political Evolution of the Chilean Military Regime," p. 118.
13. In 1989 in the Santiago metropolitan region alone, over 2,000 popular economic organizations of various types were operating. For a breakdown of their numbers, see Roberto Urmeneta, "Los pequeños (y grandes) esfuerzos de las organizaciones económicas populares," Mensaje 383 (Octubre 1989), p. 442.
14. In addition to the increase in symbolic influence acquired as a result of the church's commitment to prevent the military from completely controlling the public discourse, the church has acquired important new sources of financial resources. First, it has successfully raised international aid through Catholic and non-Catholic sources for its expanded commitments. As well, for reasons of security, the church served as a conduit for funds for a variety of non-Catholic organizations until the late 1980s.
15. Statistical Yearbook of the Church 1987 (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1989), p. 241; and Felician Foy, ed., Catholic Almanac 1975 (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1974), p. 409.
16. For example, Der Spiegel projects that if Protestant membership continues to grow at the same rate, 40 percent of the Chilean population will identify themselves as Protestant by the year 2000. The assumptions behind this projection can be questioned, but this kind of statement presents a fundamental challenge to the Catholic church. "A Quiet Revolution in Latin America: Is the Roman Catholic Bulwark Turning Protestant?" World Press Review, March 1991, p. 30.
17. By late 1991, the dominant strains of the Socialist Party, excluding the Partido Sociatista-Almeyda, had reunited after shattering into a variety of schisms after the coup. Perhaps the most significant new party is the Party for Democracy (PPD) under the leadership of Ricardo Lagos, though its future as of late 1991 is uncertain
18. Mrs. Pinochet was widely quoted in the press for exclaiming when she learned of Fresno's appointment that "God had finally answered her prayers."
19. For an excellent discussion of the role of Bishop Camus in the process of redemocratization and the differing views of his contribution across party fines see Patricio Dooner, Iglesia, Reconciliación y Democracia (Santiago: Editorial Andante, 1989).
20. José Antonio Viera-Gallo, "La iglesia chilena en su actuar público," Mensaje, Enero-Febrero 1989, p. 12.
21. The Democratic Alliance included parties ranging from the center-right to portions of the fragmented socialists.
22. Jaime Ruiz-Tagle, "La visita del Papa: Perspectivas sociopolíticas," Mensaje 358 (Mayo 1987) p. 134.
23. Ronaldo Muñoz y Manuel de Ferari, "Juan Pablo II en Chile," Mensaje 358 (Mayo 1987), p. 142.
28. The government passed a tax reform that raised corporate and valueadded taxes in June 1990 in order to fund increased social spending. Arturo Valenzuela and Pamela Constable, "Democracy in Chile," Current History, February 1991, p. 54.
29. Chile Report (Santiago, Chile: Justice and Peace Commission of Maryknoll Missioners, July-August 1990), p. 9.
30. Chile Report (Santiago, Chile: Justice and Peace Commission of the Maryknoll Missioners in Chile, September-December, 1990), p. 11.
33. Ivan Radovic, "ONG en democracia," Mensaje 385 (Diciembre 1989), p. 535.
34. Jaunita Rojas, "Nuevo arzobispo de Santiago: Los entretelones de la designación," Análisis, 16-22 de Abril de 1990, p. 18.
38. "Arzobispo de Santiago hizo llamado a la unidad y al imperio de la razón en Chile," La Epoca, Miércoles 19 de Septiembre de 1990, p. 13.
39. "Amigo de pobres y ricos," El Mercurio, 1 de Abril de 1990, p. D3.
40. Raquel Correa, "El arzobispo, a lo humano y a lo divino," El Mercurio, 8 de Abril de 1990; P. D1.
43. The best evidence of Fresno's traditionalism is the trend toward more conservative training of diocesan priests during his leadership of the Santiago diocese. Among other indicators, teaching or discussing liberation theology or even specifically Latin American theology is now prohibited. Interview conducted by Pascale Bonnefoy with Luis Maldonado, professor of theology, September 10, 1990.
44. See Conferencia Episcopal de Chile, "Nueva evangelización para Chile: Orientaciones pastorales 199l/994," Santiago, Area de Comunicaciones de la Conferencia Episcopal de Chile, 1990, p. 19.
45. Conferencia Episcopal de Chile, "Nueva evangelización," p. 23.
46. According to Eduardo Rojas, head of the Department of Solidarity Action and Education of the Vicaría (DAES), the Vicaria is quite satisfied with Oviedo's commitment to the Vicaria and to human rights and will abide by the archbishop's decisions regarding the Vicaria's future with "satisfaction." Interview with Pascale Bonnefoy, September 14, 1990.
47. The Supreme Court upheld a law passed by the military granting a blanket pardon for any abuses committed before 1976; however, the issue is far from resolved.
48. "Aylwin Addresses Nation on Human Rights Report," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), March 5, 1991, p. 30.
49. A study conducted by La Nación reveals that although terrorism may be up (for example, murders and bank robberies), the public's fear that crime in general is on the rapid upswing is unfounded. "Statistics Reveal Number of Crimes Committed," FBIS, May 7,1991, pp. 30-31. The church, of course, is not immune from these attacks. In addition to a sustained assault on progressive priests and parishes throughout the past decades, the government recently reported that a bodyguard and police protection have been extended to Father Raúl Hasbún, the most public of Catholic supporters of the military government, because of terrorist threats.
50. "Government, Armed Forces Respond to Rettig Report," FBIS, March 29, 1991, p. 18.
51. "Former DINA Director Contreras Denies Torture, Disappeared," Chile Information Project (CHIP), March 26,1991.
52. Conferencia Episcopal de Chile, "Nueva evangelización," p. 22.
53. Ibid., p. 79.
INDEX